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Second Generation State Takeover Legislation: Maryland 
Takes a New Tack 
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 1 the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, 2 which regulated attempts 
to gain corporate control by means of a tender offer.3 A majority of 
the Court agreed only that the law violated the commerce clause.4 
Three Justices also found that federal tender offer legislation pre-
empted the Illinois Act under the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
, tion. 5 Although it set few clear standards, 6 the MITE decision did not 
1. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.51-.70 (1981) (repealed 1983). A majority of states 
had enacted similar legislation. See Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State 
Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 689, 690 n.7 (1981). 
3. The precise definition of a "tender offer" remains unsettled. It is generally regarded as an 
invitation publicly made to all shareholders of a corporation to sell their shares at a specified 
price. See E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CoRPORATE CoNTROL 70 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as TENDER OFFERS]; see also Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" 
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1250 (1973); Note, Defining 
Tender Offers: Resolving a Decade of Dilemma, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 520 (1980). 
The popularity of the tender offer lies in its flexibility and effectiveness in comparison to the 
primary alternative method for gaining corporate control, the proxy contest. The tender offer is 
a flexible method because the tender offeror is under no duty to buy up any tendered shares if the 
total is less than the percentage stated in the offer. To the extent that the tender offeror buys up 
stock, it has an investment in the target which, even if the offer is ultimately unsuccessful, may be 
sold without significant loss. By contrast, expenses incurred in an unsuccessful proxy fight are 
relatively irrevocable. Moreover, tender offers are an effective means of gaining control because 
they can be structured to give target management little time to build up defenses and they avoid 
the proxy machinery, over which target management may have substantial control. See L. Loss, 
F'uNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 568 (1983); Note, The Constitutionality of State 
Takeover Statutes: A Response to Great Western, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 872, 872 n.2 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Response to Great Western]; see also E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, PROXY CoN-
TESTS FOR CoRPORATE CoNTRoL 585-99 (2d ed. 1968) (early discussion of the trend to acquire 
by means of tender offer rather than proxy contest). 
4. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stevens and O'Connor joined Justice White's 
opinion of the Court holding that the Illinois statute placed impermissible indirect burdens on 
interstate commerce. Four Justices, Burger, White, Stevens and O'Connor, found that the Illi-
nois Act was also invalid because it placed a direct burden on interstate commerce. 
5. These Justices were Burger, White and Blackmun. The dissenting Justices, Brennan, Mar-
shall and Rehnquist, did not reach the merits because they believed that the case was moot. 
6. In pre-MITE decisions most lower federal courts invalidated state takeover laws on two 
grounds, holding both that the state laws were preempted by federal tender offer regulation and 
that the laws violated the commerce clause. See cases cited at note 44 infra. The commerce 
clause test applied by the Supreme Court in MITE called for balancing the burdens the Illinois 
statute placed on interstate commerce against the local benefits it produced. See notes 75-83 
infra and accompanying text. This test provides few clear standards for evaluating the constitu-
tionality of new and different forms of state takeover legislation. Had the court been able to 
agree on some version of preemption analysis, it might have quieted the controversy surrounding 
the constitutional status of state takeover regulation. Resolution of the preemption issue would 
have required definition of the policies behind federal tender offer regulation and an examination 
of the effect state regulation has on those policies. See Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism: 
Interpreting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 VA. L. REV. 813, 842-45 (1984). Such an 
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explicitly prohibit all state efforts in the tender offer area. 7 Thus, cer-
tain state legislatures have responded with what might be termed a 
"second generation" of takeover legislation. 8 Their objective is to 
avoid constitutional conflict while retaining a meaningful regulatory 
role for the states in the takeover process. 
This Note examines the approach recently adopted by the Mary-
land legislature in special session one year after the Supreme Court's 
decision in MITE.9 Maryland has departed radically from the regula-
tory approach of first generation statutes;10 however, this Note argues 
that the statute has failed to escape the constitutional infirmities of its 
predecessors. 11 Part I outlines the various mechanisms that regulate 
acquisition of corporate control: the federal tender offer regulatory 
mechanism known as the Williams Act, 12 state takeover legislation 
such as the Illinois statute invalidated in MITE, and the new Mary-
land statute. Part II analyzes the debate concerning the constitution-
ality of state takeover legislation. Part III applies this analysis to the 
examination in MITE would have perhaps provided lower federal courts with more guidance in 
dealing with the new state takeover statutes. 
7. The commerce clause balancing test leaves greater room for state efforts in the tender offer 
area than does preemption analysis. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, J,, 
concurring in part) ("I join •.• [the view that the balancing test invalidates the statute] because 
... [this] Commerce Clause reasoning leaves some room for state regulation of tender offers."), 
8. While most states simply amended or repealed those aspects of their takeover laws the 
Supreme Court found objectionable in Edgar v. MITE Corp., a number of states developed new 
methods for regulating takeovers. Most of the new state statutes follow one of three models: the 
Ohio approach, the Maryland approach, or the Pennsylvania approach. 
Under the Ohio statute, Omo REv. CoDE ANN.§§ 1701.01, .11, .37, .48, .831, .832, 1707.01, 
.042, .23, .26, .29, .99 (Baldwin Supp. 1983), the acquisition of controlling blocks of target shares 
requires an affirmative vote of target shareholders approving the acquisition. The Maryland leg-
islation, MD. CoRPS. & AssNS. CoDE ANN. §§ 3-601 to 3-603 (Supp. 1984), imposes 
supermajority voting requirements and fair price provisions on business combinations such as 
mergers. The Pennsylvania statute, 15 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1408(B), 1409.l(C) (l)-(3), 
1910 (Purdon 1984-85 Supp.), restricts the voting rights of "interested shareholders" in certain 
corporate transactions such as mergers and provides disinterested shareholders a right of re-
demption for their shares if a person or group acquires 30% of the corporation's stock. 
Because the statutes are recent, they have yet to generate much law review commentary. 
However, a few articles by attorneys practicing in states with the new statutes have appeared. 
See Krieder, Fortress Without A Foundation? Ohio Takeover Act II. 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 108 
(1983); Newlin & Gilmer, The Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection Act, 40 Bus. LAW. 111 
(1984); Scriggins & Clarke, Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland Fair Price Legislation, 43 Mo. L. 
RE.v. 266 (1984); see also Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing 
Pat, Blue Sky, or Corporation Law Concepts?, 7 CoRP. L. REV. 3 (1984). 
9. See MD. CoRPS. & AssNS. CoDE ANN. §§ 3-601 to 3-603 (Supp. 1984). 
10. First generation statutes focus on the tender offer for a controlling interest in the target 
corporation. The Maryland statute is aimed at regulating what the tender offerer may do (e.g., 
attempt to force a merger) after it has gained working control. The Maryland approach does, 
however, affect certain types of tender offers known as "two-tiered" or "two-step bids." See notes 
48-49 infra. 
11. For an article on the Maryland statute that takes a contrary position, see Scriggins & 
Clarke, supra note 8. 
12. The Williams Act added to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d)-(e) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e) (1982)) and § 14(d)·(f) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(f) (1982)). 
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Maryland approach. It argues that while a court may find that the 
Maryland approach fails the commerce clause balancing test employed 
in MITE, the Maryland approach is most clearly subject to attack on 
the ground that it is incompatible with congressional objectives em-
bodied in the Williams Act. Thus, the Maryland statute will force the 
courts to readdress the preemption issue left unresolved in MITE. 13 
I. THE REGULATORY MECHANISMS 
A. The Williams Act 
It is important to see how first generation statutes, such as the Illi-
nois Business Take-Over Act, built on the Williams Act. Originally, 
one of the greatest attractions of the cash tender offer device14 was the 
speed and secrecy with which an offeror could gain control of the tar-
get corporation.15 This benefit to tender offerers worked to the disad-
vantage of target shareholders who were forced to make important 
investment decisions in a short period of time.16 The Williams Act is 
designed to protect investors. It attempts to give investors the time 
and information necessary to evaluate critically the terms of a tender 
offer by imposing disclosure and substantive requirements on tender 
13. See note 6 supra. 
14. Depending on the type of consideration offered, a tender offer may be described as an 
exchange offer or a cash offer. In an exchange offer, tendering shareholders receive securities in 
exchange for their shares. In a cash tender offer, tendering shareholders give up their equity for 
cash. 
Cash tender offers have proven to be more popular than exchange offers in the hostile take-
over bid setting. Exchange offers are subject to more cumbersome registration requirements than 
cash offers. See note 15 infra. The greater speed and surprise of the cash offer device benefits 
tender offerers by minimizing the time for target management to set up a defense or for other 
offerers to make a competing bid. See Troubh, Purchased Affection: a Primer on Cash Tender 
Offers, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1976, at 79, 80. 
15. The Williams Act was designed to correct a perceived gap in federal securities law. See 
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 550]; H.R. REP. 
No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CoNG. & An. NEWS 2811, 2814 
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1711, reprinted in 1968 U.S. ConE CoNG. & An. NEWS]. 
Proxy contests for corporate control had long been regulated under § 14(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982). In the tender offer context, exchange offers 
had also long been subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-(h), 77(j) (1982). Cash tender offers, however, had remained unregulated under 
federal law until the Williams Act. Although the Williams Act originally regulated only cash 
offers, Congress extended the coverage of the Act in 1970 to include exchange offers. Act of Dec. 
22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982)). For some 
early commentary on the Williams Act, see, e.g., Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate 
Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149 (1966) (supporting federal regulation); Mundheim, Why 
the Bill on Tender Offers Should Not Be Passed, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 1967, at 24 
(against federal regulation). 
16. See S. REP. No. 550, supra note 15, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 1711 at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. 
ConE CoNG. & An. NEWS at 2812, supra note 15 ("[B]y using a cash tender offer the person 
seeking control can operate in almost complete secrecy .••• [T]he investor is severely limited in 
obtaining all of the facts on which to base a decision whether_ to accept or reject the tender 
offer."). 
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off erors. 17 
The Williams Act provides that a person who acquires18 beneficial 
ownership of more than five percent19 of the shares of a publicly held 
corporation registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange 
Act20 must disclose detailed information concerning its identity, back-
ground and plans for the target.21 Disclosure must be made on the 
date of the commencement of the tender offer.22 Target management 
is also subject to the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act.23 
17. Senator Williams, the chief sponsor of the Act, explained the purpose of the bill before 
Congress: "This legislation will close a significant gap in investor protection under the Federal 
Securities laws by requiring the disclosure of pertinent information to stockholders when persons 
seek to obtain control of a corporation by a cash tender offer ••.. " 113 CONG. REc. 854 
(1967). See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 24-37 (1977) (discussing the legislative 
histocy of the Williams Act). 
18. The Williams Act regulates a number of methods for acquiring shares in a target corpo-
ration. Section 13(d) governs open market purchases and private negotiations. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78m(d) (1982). Section 14(d) governs tender offers. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982). 
19. The 5% figure represents congressional intent to insure disclosure of securities accumula· 
tions that have the potential for affecting corporate control and hence the market value of the 
security. The Williams Act originally mandated disclosure upon 10% acquisition. Congress 
lowered the figure to 5% as part of the 1970 amendments to the Williams Act in order to provide 
public disclosure at a more meaningful level. See Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 
1970 Amendments, 26 Bus. LAW. 1637 (1971). 
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78(e) (1982). Section 12 applies to issuers engaged in or affecting interstate 
commerce whose securities are either listed on a national securities exchange or are held on 
record by at least 500 persons if the issuer has total assets exceeding $1 million. The $1 million 
figure has recently been increased to $3 million by the SEC under its rulemaking authority in 
order to account for inflation. Sec. Ex. Act of 1934 Release No. 18,647, 25 SEC Dock. (CCH) 49 
(1982). 
A significant number of corporations that are quoted over the counter and do not meet the 
alternate section 12 requirements are therefore exempt from section 14(d) of the Williams Act. 
Insofar as states limit the reach of their takeover statutes to tender offers for exempt corporations 
they may successfully avoid a constitutional challenge on preemption grounds. This Note fo. 
cuses on the application of state takeover statutes to tender offers that are covered by section 12 
of the 1934 Act and section 14(d) of the Williams Act. 
21. The acquirer must fill out a Schedule 13(D) (for private negotiations or open market 
purchases), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1982), or a Schedule 14(D) (for tender offers) § 78n(d) 
(1982). The information required in each is substantially the same. The acquirer must disclose 
its background and identity, the source and amount of funds to be used in making the purchases, 
and its purpose in making the purchases (e.g., to gain control of the target in order to merge it 
with another corporation or to sell the target's assets). The SEC is authorized to require addi· 
tional information in order to protect investors. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982). The required 
additional information is set out in SEC Rule 14d-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6 (1984). For a general 
discussion of the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act, see Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure 
In Connection With Cosh Takeover Bids: The New Regulations, 24 Bus. LAW. 19 (1968). 
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1984). SEC Rule 14d·2 defines 
"commencement" of the tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1984). In contrast, a Schedule 
13(D) must be filed within ten days after acquisition of five percent of the target's shares. 15 
U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l (1984). The earlier filing date for tender of· 
fers, as compared to open market purchases or private negotiations, reflects a congressional con· 
cern for the increased speed afforded by the tender offer device in gaining corporate control. 
Empirical Research Project, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New Importance For 
An Old Battleground, 7 J. CoRP. L. 689, 732 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Research Project]. 
23. Section 14(d)(4) of the Williams Act requires that anyone who recommends to target 
shareholders to accept or reject a tender offer must comply with SEC rules and regulations. 15 
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Despite the pro-management bias of the earlier versions of the Act,24 
the final version attempts to equalize offerors' and target manage-
ment's opportunity to appeal to the stockholders.2s 
The Williams Act also contains three substantive provisions regu-
lating public tender offers. The object of these provisions is to protect 
investors by alleviating some of the pressure inherent in deciding when 
or indeed whether to tender their shares. These provisions regulate 
the withdrawal rights of tendering shareholders,26 the tender offeror's 
duties to purchase shares when an offer is oversubscribed,27 and the 
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1982). The SEC has provided disclosure requirements that must accompany 
such recommendations in Rule 14d-9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1984). 
SEC Rule 14e-2 requires the target company to address its stockholders on the question of 
how they should respond to the offer. The target company must publish a statement within 10 
business days of the tender offer indicating that management: (1) Recommends acceptance or 
rejection of the offer, (2) Expresses no opinion and is remaining neutral toward the offer, or (3) Is 
unable to take a position with respect to the offer and explains the reasons for this inability. 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1984). 
24. Fears that management and investors had to be protected from corporate "raiders" pro-
vided the initial impetus behind federal tender offer regulation. See 111 CoNG. R.Ec. 28,257 
(1965) (Remarks of Sen. Williams) ("[T]he Federal Securities laws remain inadequate in one 
notable respect. They fail to take proper cognizance of the activities of corporate raiders."); see 
also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. l, 30 (1977). 
25. According to the Senate Committee: 
The Committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in 
favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. The bill is designed 
to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time provid-
ing the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case. 
S. REP. No. 550, supra note 15, at 3. The shift away from the antitakeover stance of the original 
Williams Bill is an important indicator of congressional intent in tender offer regulation. The 
legislative history of the final version of the Act suggests Congress determined to leave tender 
offer markets relatively unfettered in recognition that tender offers may benefit target investors 
and the national economy. See notes 87-111 infra and accompanying text. 
26. The Act provides for withdrawal rights within the first seven days of the offer and 60 
days after the offer becomes effective. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982). The object of this provision 
is to give tendering shareholders an opportunity to reconsider their offer of stock for tender if, for 
instance, target management sheds new light on the desirability of the offer or if there is a com-
peting offer. See 113 CoNG. R.Ec. 856 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams). Section 14(d)(5) em-
powers the SEC to extend the withdrawal period if necessary to protect investors. The SEC has 
extended the period to 15 business days from the commencement of the offer. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14d-7(a)(l) (1984). 
27. In the situation where a tender offer is made for less than all of the total outstanding 
shares of the target (a partial offer), the offer may be oversubscribed. The Act requires the tender 
offeror to take up tendered shares pro rata according to the number of securities tendered by each 
stockholder in the first 10 days of the offer. If the consideration for target shares is increased, a 
new pro rata period is applicable for 10 days after the increase. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982). 
This provision was designed to reduce the pressure on a target shareholder to sell his or her 
shares quickly. Originally, tender offerors purchased securities on a "first come, first served" 
basis. The pro rata provision insures acceptance of at least a portion of a shareholder's shares 
submitted within the appropriate time period. Safe in this knowledge, the shareholder may take 
the time necessary to assess the offer instead of feeling compelled to tender immediately for fear 
of the offer being oversubscribed. See 113 CoNG. R.Ec. 856 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 
Hearings on H.R. 14475 and S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968) (remarks of Manuel 
F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC). 
A recent rule promulgated by the SEC has extended the pro-rata period to include the entire 
offer period. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1984). The SEC expressed the view that the 10-day period 
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consideration paid to tendering shareholders. 28 In addition to these 
three substantive provisions, the Williams Act contains an anti-fraud 
provision. This provision makes it unlawful to make any untrue state-
ment or material omission or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive or 
manipulative practices in connection with any tender offer.29 
B. First Generation State Takeover Legislation 
After Congress passed the Williams Act, state legislatures began to 
develop tender offer regulation of their own in order to correct per-
ceived weaknesses in the federal regulatory scheme. While state efforts 
in this area are hardly uniform, first generation statutes often contain 
certain core provisions. Some of these provisions are simply more 
stringent cousins of the disclosure and substantive provisions of the 
Williams Act.30 However, provisions for notification of state authori-
ties and target management before commencement of a tender offer,31 
administrative hearings and fairness determinations concerning the 
terms of a tender offer, 32 and "friendly" offer exemptions33 are unique 
did not give target shareholders enough time to consider the merits of an offer given the confu-
sion generated by changing proration periods (in the event of increased consideration) and multi-
ple proration pools (in the event of competing tender offers). See Proposed Pro Rata Rule, SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 18,761, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 
~ 83,222 (May 25, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Release No. 18,761]. The SEC has been criticized 
for exceeding its rulemaking authority in promulgating Rule 14d-8. See notes 157-60 infra and 
accompanying text. 
28. If a tender offeror increases the consideration offered to nontendering shareholders, that 
increase must be paid to all tendering shareholders, whether the shares were tendered before or 
after the increase. 15 U.S.C. § 78n{d){7) (1982). The purpose of this provision is to insure equal 
treatment of all tendering shareholders. See H.R. REP. No. 1711 at 11, reprinted in 1968 U.S. 
CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS at 2821, supra note 15. 
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). This provision applies to the statements and omissions of 
anyone who attempts to influence the decision of investors faced with a tender offer. Thus, it 
applies to target management as well as to the tender offeror. 
30. Most state takeover statutes require tender offerors to disclose more information than is 
required by the Williams Act. See, e.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 22-1902(b) (Supp. 1984); HAWAII 
REv. STAT. § 417E-3(c) (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. § 552.05(2)(c) (1981); see also Note, A Failed 
Experiment: State Takeover Regulation After Edgar v. MITE Corp., 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 456, 
463 (discussing the disclosure provision of the Illinois Act). 
State statutes also often extend the substantive protections of the Williams Act. Some man· 
date longer withdrawal periods. Se'e. e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 45.57.010(2) {1984) {21-day with· 
drawal right); DEL. CoDE. ANN. tit. 8, § 203{a)(2) (1983) {20 days); cf. note 26 supra (SEC 
Rule). Others extend the proration period for the duration of the offer. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. 
LAWS ch. llOC § 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984); s.c. CoDE ANN.§ 35-2-80(4) (Supp. 1983). 
Hawaii does not permit partial offers. HAWAII REv. STAT.§ 417E-2(3) (1982); cf. note 27 supra 
(SEC Rule). 
31. The notification period varies among the states. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 1602 
(McKinney Supp. 1984-85) (no extra period); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1264.25 (1980) (10-day 
period); Illinois Business Take-Over Act § 4, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 137.54(E) (1981) 
(repealed 1983) {20 days); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78B-4(a) (1981) {30-day period); HAWAII REV. 
STAT. § 417E-3(f) (1976) (60 days). By contrast, the Williams Act requires only that the tender 
offeror file its disclosure statement on the day of the commencement of the offer. See note 22 
supra and accompanying text. 
32. Many state takeover statutes provide for mandatory or discretionary administrative re· 
view of materials disclosed by the tender offeror in order to insure compliance with statutory 
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to state statutes. 
The professed intent34 behind these provisions is to give investors 
more time to consider the merits of a tender offer.35 Proponents of 
state takeover legislation suggest that such an intent is consonant with 
congressional design. 36 But, the effect of most first generation statutes 
is to delay the effectiveness of a tender offer.37 Opponents of state 
takeover legislation argue that the delay produced by state statutes 
impermissibly upsets the Williams Act's neutral balance between 
tender offerors and target management by making it easier for target 
management to defeat a tender offer.~8 If the state statutes undermine 
requirements. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. llOC, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984); 
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 1604 (McKinney Supp. 1984-85). In the case of the Illinois Act invali-
dated in MITE, a hearing could be called for the purpose of determining the substantive fairness 
of the offer. Illinois Business Take-Over Act§ 7, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121-1/2 § 137.57E (1981) 
(repealed 1983). Substituting administrative judgments concerning fairness for market controls 
has been heavily criticized. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 719; Note, supra note 30, at 463-64. 
33. Many state takeover statutes exempt from coverage those tender offers that are approved 
by target management and are subject to shareholder vote. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. 
§ 45.57.110(2)(E) (1980); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 451.904(2)(d) (West Supp. 1984-85) (en-
forcement of statute enjoined as a probable burden on interstate co=erce in Martin-Marietta 
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982)). The friendly offer exemptions arguably 
benefit investors by inducing tender offerors to negotiate with their fiduciaries, target manage-
ment; however, these exemptions have been construed as primarily benefiting management. See 
note 38 infra. 
34. The stated purpose of most state statutes has been to provide increased investor protec-
tion. Some states, however, clearly wanted to protect in-state management from the threat of a 
takeover. Compare Illinois Business Take-Over Act § 1.1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, 
§ 137.51-1 (1981) (repealed 1983) (investor protection), with 1976 KY. ACTS 534 (codified at KY. 
REV. STAT. §§ 292.560-.630 (1981)) (prevention of takeover bids). Moreover, despite the de-
clared statutory goal of investor protection, many co=entators believe that many statutes were 
designed to attract corporate domiciliaries or to remove in-state corporations' incentive to 
reincorporate in a state with a more favorable statute. If such a parochial intent may be attrib-
uted to the state statutes, they are subject to a strong co=erce clause and preemption attack. 
See Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects and Political Competency, 62 
CoRNELL L. REv. 213, 241-53 (1977); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Stat-
utes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. l, 18 (1976); Note, Commerce Clause 
Limitations Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 1133, 1159 (1974). But 
cf. Note, Response to Great Western, supra note 3, at 895-905 (questioning why state statute's 
proffered purpose should be rejected). 
35. Pre-commencement notification and administrative hearing provisions can slow down 
the tender offer process. Such provisions make it easier to insure full disclosure and help to 
reduce the pressure atmosphere surrounding a tender offer. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 716-19; 
Note, Response to Great Western, supra note 3, at 916; Note, Securities Law and the Constitution: 
State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 524 (1979). 
36. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 717; Note, supra note 35, at 524; Note, Response to Great 
Western, supra note 3, at 916. 
37. Both proponents and opponents of state takeover statutes agree that the statutes intro-
duce delay into the takeover process. Sargent, supra note 2, at 717 (proponent); Wilner & Landy, 
supra note 34, at 9 (opponents). The constitutional issue is whether by introducing this delay the 
states have overstepped the bounds of permissible regulation. 
38. See E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS 
FOR CoRPORATE CoNTROL 225-29 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENTS]; Langevoort, 
supra note 34, at 249; Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 687, 700 
(1975); Wilner & Landy, supra note 34, at 25-29. Delay may benefit target management for a 
number of reasons. Management gains time to implement defensive tactics such as amending the 
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the federal policy embodied in the Williams Act then they are subject 
to attack under the preemption doctrine. 39 
Delay of the effectiveness of a tender offer may also impermissibly 
burden interstate commerce.4-0 However, even more constitutionally 
suspect under the commerce clause are the jurisdictional provisions of 
many first generation state statutes.41 Under these state statutes a state 
could regulate tender offers for targets incorporated and doing busi-
ness in other states if a required percentage of target shareholders re-
side in the forum state.42 The extraterritorial reach of state takeover 
legislation may subject tender offerors to the difficult task of comply-
ing with the varying requirements of different state statutes.43 This 
possibility, when coupled with state statutory provisions that tend to 
delay the tender offer process or otherwise aid target management, has 
led courts to strike down first generation state takeover legislation on 
commerce clause grounds, preemption grounds, or both. 44 
corporate charter, searching for a friendly corporation or "white knight" to make a competing 
bid, or having the target buy up its own stock. On defensive tactics see generally DEVELOP· 
MBNTS, supra, at 193-202; TENDER OFFERS, supra note 3, at 219-76. 
Even if target management abstains from employing defensive tactics, delay will permit mar-
ket forces to work to management's advantage: 
A target's most effective defensive tactic is to stall for time, allowing market forces to make 
it undesirable for shareholders to relinquish their securities. A public announcement of a 
tender offer will stimulate open-market purchase of the target's securities by present share-
holders or speculators expecting to realize a quick profit on their short term investment. 
Active trading will raise the price of the target's securities, and, as the market price draws 
closer to the tender offer price, the economic incentive for shareholders to sell their stock 
will fade. · 
Wilner & Landy, supra note 34, at 10 (footnotes omitted). 
Friendly offer exemptions do not create delay, but have been criticized as pro-management 
devices inconsistent with the regulatory neutrality of the Williams Act. See Great Western 
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. 
Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Sargent, supra note 2, at 698; Shipman, Some 
Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RBs. 
L. RBv. 722, 767 (1970). 
39. See notes 84-85 infra and accompanying text. 
40. See notes 76-77 infra and accompanying text. 
41. See note 69 infra. 
42. For example, the Illinois Act at issue in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), 
applied to a tender offeror acquiring at least 5% of the outstanding shares of a target corporation. 
The statute defined a target as a ciirporation in which Illinois shareholders owned 10% of the 
class of securities subject to the tender offer or for which any two of the following conditions 
were met: (1) the corporation had its principal executive office in Illinois; (2) it was organized 
under Illinois law; (3) it had at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented 
within the state. Illinois Business Take-Over Act§ 2.10, ILL. RBv. STAT. ch. 121-2, § 137.52-10 
(1981) (repealed 1983). 
43. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 502 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[T)he disruptive effects of 
the Illinois Act could be duplicated by other states seeking simultaneously to assert jurisdiction 
over a tender offer."), affd. sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). However, this 
criticism is "somewhat muted" with respect to the Illinois Act, which permitted, under its com· 
ity provision, the state administrator to defer to other jurisdictions in appropriate circumstances. 
MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 502 n.31. 
44. For some pre-Edgar v. MITE decisions, see, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 
(3d Cir. 1980) (granting preliminary injunctive relief against the New Jersey takeover statute on 
the ground that the statute was likely to be declared preempted by the Williams Act); MITE 
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C. Maryland Statute 
In 1976 the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Maryland 
Corporate Takeover Law.45 This statute, like most first generation 
state takeover legislation, regulated the tender offer as a means of gain-
ing corporate control. In September, 1982, a federal district court 
ruled Maryland's 1976 Act unconstitutional on preemption and com-
merce clause grounds.46 In a June, 1983, special session, the Mary-
land General Assembly passed a bill that adopts a new approach to the 
problems of corporate takeovers and state protection of stockholders' 
interests.47 The Maryland statute regulates what is often called the 
second "step" or "tier" of a takeover process. 48 Instead of regulating 
the tender offer process itself, the new statute regulates what course of 
Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), affd. sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 
(1982) (Illinois statute invalidated on preemption and commerce clause grounds); Great Western 
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978) (Idaho statute invalidated on preemption 
and commerce clause grounds), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United 
Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981) (Nevada 
statute invalidated on preemption and commerce clause grounds); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. 
Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (enforcement of Pennsylvania statute enjoined on preemption and 
commerce clause grounds); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206 (D.N.J. 1981) (New 
Jersey statute invalidated on preemption and commerce clause grounds); Hi-Shear Indus. v. 
Campbell, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 97,804 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980) 
(enforcement of South Carolina statute enjoined on preemption and commerce clause grounds). 
But see AMCA Intl. Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio statute valid); 
Hi-Shear Indus. v. Neiditz, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1197,805 (D. Conn. 
Dec. 3, 1980) (Connecticut statute will not be invalidated unless state administrator exercises his 
statutory discretion in such a way as to conflict with the Williams Act or place impermissible 
burdens on interstate commerce). The Ohio statute was later invalidated on preemption grounds 
when the SEC adopted a rule that was inconsistent with the Ohio precommencement notification 
provision. See Canadian Pacific Enters. (U.S.), Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 
1981). 
For some post-MITE decisions, see, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 
1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (Oklahoma statute invalidated on commerce clause grounds); Telvest, Inc. 
v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia statute invalidated on commerce clause 
grounds); National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri Takeover 
Act invalidated on preemption and commerce clause grounds); Agency Rent-A-Car v. Connolly, 
686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982) (Massachusetts statute not preempted by Williams Act, case re-
manded for consideration of the statute's validity under the commerce clause); Bendix Corp. v. 
Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982) (Maryland statute invalidated on pre-
emption and commerce clause grounds). But see Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 
906 (8th Cir. 1984) (Minnesota statute not facially unconstitutional if narrowly construed). 
45. 1976 Md. Laws 1712 (codified at MD. CoRPS. & AssNs. CoDE ANN. §§ 11-901 to 11-908 
(Supp. 1984)). 
46. Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982). 
47. The emergency bill, simply named House Bill No. 1, repealed and reenacted with amend-
ments Mo. CoRPS. & AssNs. CooE ANN. §§ 3-202, 8-301(12) & 8-301(13). New sections, MD. 
CORPS. & AssNs. CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 through 3-603 inclusive and § 8-301(14) were added. 
48. In the first tier or step of a "two-tier'' takeover bid the offeror gains control of the target 
through open market purchases of target shares, privately negotiated purchases or a tender offer. 
In the second step, the purchaser or tender offeror uses its control to obtain complete ownership 
of the target usually by merging the target corporation into itself. See Toms, Compensating 
Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 548, 548 (1978); Comment, 
Front-End Loaded Tender Offers: The Application of Federal and State Law to an Innovative 
Corporate Acquisition Technique, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 389, 389-92 (1982). 
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action a tender offeror may take after it has succeeded in gaining a 
controlling interest in the target.49 
The Maryland statute responds to concerns over the vulnerability 
of minority target shareholders after a successful tender offeror as-
sumes control. so By virtue of its controlling interest, the tender offeror 
may be able to make fundamental changes in the target's corporate 
structure against the will of the remaining target shareholders.51 The 
Maryland General Assembly found most objectionable the tender of-
feror's ability to "freezeout"52 minority shareholders at a price lower 
49. The Maryland statute does, however, regulate "front-end loaded two-tier lender offers." 
That is, instead of making an offer for 100% of the target shares at one price the two-tier tender 
offerer may announce that it will make an offer for less than 100% of the target's shares at one 
price and, if successful, will use its controlling interest to "freezeout," see note 52 infra, the 
remaining shareholders at a lower price. This is a powerful acquisition technique because it 
pressures target shareholders to tender in the first step or risk being frozen out at the lower price 
in the second step. See Bradney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 
88 HARV. L. REv. 297, 337 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fair Shares]; Bradney & Chirelstein, A 
Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 81 YALE L.J. 1354, 1361-62 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Restatement]; Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Cu"ent Regulation of Mergers and Acquisi-
tions, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 676-93 (1984); Comment, supra note 48, at 403-13. The Maryland 
statute prohibits a lower second step price, effectively eliminating the front-end loaded tender 
offer. See note 141 infra and accompanying text. 
50. DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE, STAFF REPORT TO THE GENERAL AssEM· 
BLY OF MARYLAND, Extraordinary Session, June 1983, at 14 (1983) (intent of Maryland statute 
is to protect target shareholders in the second step of a takeover) [hereinafter cited as STAFF 
REPORT]. 
S 1. Fundamental changes in corporate structure, such as mergers or sales of corporate assets, 
must ordinarily be approved by both the target's board of directors and its shareholders. See, 
e.g., DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1983) (requiring majority vote of shareholders); N.Y. Bus. 
CoRP. LAW§ 903 (McKinney Supp. 1984) (requiring 2/3 vote of shareholders). However, if the 
ownership of the rest of the corporate stock is scattered or isolated a tender ofl'eror may be able 
to control corporate affairs with significantly less than a majority interest and thus affect the 
merger or sale of assets. 
In the rare case where a tender offerer acquires 90% to 95% of the target's stock, it may 
utilize the short-form merger procedure available in many states to effect a merger without share-
holder approval. See, e.g., DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1983) (requiring 90% control of the 
corporation's shares); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 905 (McKinney Supp. 1984) (requiring 90%). 
Short form merger statutes are designed to give force to the will of a dominant majority of 
shareholders in the face of a recalcitrant or hostile minority. See Note, The Short Merger Statute, 
32 U. Cm. L. REv. 596, 598 (1965). 
52. In its strictest sense, a freezeout involves action taken by the controlling shareholders of a 
corporation solely for the purpose of terminating minority shareholders' equity interest in the 
enterprise. See Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 11 
HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192-93 (1964);see also Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) 
(holding that a cause of action by minority shareholders exists in the event of a freezeout even if 
the majority's actions meet the letter of the law); but see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 
701, 715 (Del. 1983) (severely limiting the scope and effect of Singer). 
In the traditional case of a merger approved by the board of directors and at least a majority 
of the shareholders of two independent corporations dealing at arm's length, the controlling and 
minority shareholders receive identical treatment. The terms of the merger, approved by a ma-
jority of stockholders of each corporation, apply equally to all. Freezeout mergers differ in that 
the acquiring corporation is also the contrt>lling shareholder of the target. The acquiring corpo-
ration can cause the target to be merged into it and "freezeout" the remaining target sharehold-
ers by providing in the merger plan that each target share be traded for cash. The acquiring 
corporation can then use its controlling interest in the target to carry out the merger plan. For a 
concise description of the difference between arm's length mergers and freezeout mergers, see 
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than the premium price initially offered by the tender offeror in order 
to gain its controlling interest. 53 
The Maryland statute attempts to protect minority target share-
holders by changing state corporate law voting requirements for cer-
tain major corporate transactions and by adding provisions governing 
the rights of objecting stockholders. Any business combination54 must ~ 
be recommended by the target company's Board of Directors and ap-
proved by at least eighty percent of the outstanding shares eligible to 
vote and at least two-thirds of the voting shares not owned by the 
interested stockholder55 or its affiliates. 56 This means that a business 
combination such as a merger must be approved by a "supermajority" 
of the target company's shareholders. 
The stated purpose of Maryland's supermajority voting require-
ment is to give weight to minority interests in the governance of major 
corporate affairs. 57 However, in order to prevent a tyranny of the mi-
nority, the Maryland law provides for an exemption to the 
supermajority requirement commonly called a fair price provision. A 
supermajority vote does not apply if the cash or other consideration 
(e.g., securities) received by minority shareholders in a business combi-
nation is at least equal in value to the highest figure yielded by a com-
plicated statutory formula. 58 Thus, a tender offeror may freezeout the 
minority if it is willing to abide by the fair price provision. In this 
way, the Maryland approach seeks to balance the interests of control-
ling and dissenting shareholders after a successful tender offer. 
The voting restrictions and fair price provision of the new Mary-
land statute are similar to those found in recent shareholder-adopted 
Restatement, supra note 49, at 1357-58; Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A Proposed Analy-
sis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487, 488-90 (1976). 
Some commentators would use the term freezeout even when target shareholders are not 
forced to give up their equity if the consideration they receive is inadequate. The emphasis is 
placed not on the cashing out of the target shareholders, but on the controlling shareholder's 
ability to set the merger terms to its advantage. See Greene, supra, at 489 n.8; Toms, supra note 
48, at 548, n.2. 
53. STAFF REPORT, supra note 50, at 9. 
54. "Business Combination" is defined broadly in the Maryland statute. See Mo. CoRPS. & 
AssNS. CooE ANN. § 3-601(e) (Supp. 1984). 
55. Section 3-601(j) of the Maryland statute provides: 
"Interested Stockholder" means any person (other than the corporation or any subsidiary) 
that: 
(1) (i) Is the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of 10 percent or more of the voting 
power of the outstanding voting stock of the corporation; or 
(ii) Is an affiliate of the corporation and at any time within the 2 year period immedi-
ately prior to the date in question was the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of 10 
percent or more of the voting power of the then outstanding voting stock of the corporation. 
MD. CoRPS. & AssNS. CoDE ANN. § 3-60l(j) (Supp. 1984). 
56. MD. CORPS. & AssNS. CoDE ANN. § 3-602 (Supp. 1984). 
57. STAFF REPORT, supra note 50, at 15. 
58. Section 3-603(b) of the Maryland statute entitles holders of common stock of the target 
to the highest of the following figures: 
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corporate charter amendments. 59 As shareholder-adopted corporate 
charter amendments, these provisions may be permissible. 60 The es-
sential issue is whether a state can constitutionally impose these 
"shark-repellent amendments" on all corporate domic~:aries in the 
name of investor protection. 6t '' 
In addition to providing protection against hostile t~keover bids, 
the Maryland statute grants the Board of Directors of a target com-
pany wide discretion to define various combinations it wishes to ex-
clude from coverage under the new law.62 This "ftjendly offer" 
exemption was necessary to gain support for the statute from the busi-
ness community.63 But, the exemption, supermajority, and fair price 
provisions of the Maryland statute present problems similar to those 
found in first generation statutes. The. Maryland approach may imper-
missibly burden interstate commerce and interfere with the principles 
of investor autonomy and neutrality in the Williams Act. 
(1) Highest price per share (including brokerage commissions and transfer taxes) paid 
by the interested shareholder for any target shares acquired by it for the two year period 
prior to the first general public announcement of the proposed business combination. 
(2) Highest price per share paid by the interested stockholder in the transaction in 
which it became an interested stockholder. 
(3) Market value of target shares on the day of the first general public announcement of 
the proposed business combination. , 
(4) Market value of target shares on the day on which the interested stockholder first 
became an interested stockholder. 
(5) The figure arrived at through formula (3) multiplied by the fraction of the highest 
price per share paid by the interested stockholder for target shares for the period two years 
before the first general public announcement of the proposed business combination over the 
market value of target shares on the first day in that two year period that the interested 
stockholder acquired target shares. 
(6) The figure arrived at through formula (4) multiplied by the fraction described in 
formula (5). 
Note that in formulas (5) & (6) the fraction will be greater than one unless the highest 
price paid for target shares is equal to first day price. 
See MD. CoRPS. & AssNs. CoDE ANN.§ 3-603(b) (Supp. 1984). 
59. See, e.g .• FOSTER WHEELER CoRP., PROXY STATEMENT (Mar. 18, 1983), reprinted in 2 
A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, REsPONSES, AND PLANNING, 693-705 (1983). 
60. The charter amendments are permissible under state enabling Jaws. See, e.g., DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(4) (1983); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 616(a)(2) (McKinney 1963). But see 
notes 184-85 infra and accompanying text. 
With respect to corporate charter amendments adopted by shareholder vote, the SEC re· 
quires extensive disclosure of the amendments' potential harm to investors' interests and their 
tendency to benefit management in a takeover contest. See Disclosure in Proxy and Information 
Statements; Anti-Takeover or Similar Proposals, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,230, 
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,748 (Oct. 13, 1918). 
61. See notes 183-91 infra and accompanying text. 
62. MD. CoRPS. & AssNS. CoDB ANN. § 3-603(c)(l) (Supp. 1984). 
63. See note 181 infra. Another statutory exemption deserves special attention. Business 
combinations involving targets that, prior to July l, 1983, already had a shareholder with a 10% 
or greater beneficial interest in the company are exempted. MD. CoRPS. & AssNs. CODE ANN. 
§ 3-603(d)(l) (Supp. 1984). 
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FIRST GENERATION STATE 
TAKEOVER LEGISLATION 
The cons4-;tutionality of first generation state takeover statutes has 
been challenged on two grounds. Opponents of the statutes claim that 
such regulation violates the commerce clause and that the Williams 
Act preempts state regulation of nationwide tender offers under the 
supremacy cl~use. 64 
This Part'.examines the validity of these constitutional objections. 
First, this Pa.ft: delineates the commerce clause analysis of first genera-
tion state tak~over statutes that provided the basis for the opinion of 
the Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp. Next, this Part reviews the argu-
ments for and against preemption, and suggests guidelines for deter-
mining when state tender offer legislation defeats congressional 
purposes and should therefore be preempted. This Part concludes that 
state regulation is not always inconsistent with congressional objec-
tives in the Williams Act but that the states may play only a limited 
regulatory role. 
A. Commerce Clause 
The commerce clause provides that "Congress shall have Power 
. [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States."65 The 
individual states, however, are not altogether excluded from exercising 
regulatory power that has an effect on interstate commerce. 66 Under 
the Pike test,67 "[a] state statute must be upheld if it 'regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects 
on interstate commerce are only incidental . . . unless the burden im-
posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits.' "68 In MITE, Justice White, writing for a plurality, 
found that the Illinois Act violated this test for two reasons. First, the 
64. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 34; Moylan, supra note 38; Wilner & Landy, supra note 
34; Note, supra note 34. But see, e.g., Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look 
at the Theoretical Underpinnings a/Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733 (1979); 
Sargent, supra note 2; Shipman, supra note 38; Note, Response to Great Western, supra note 3; 
Note, supra note 35. 
65. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
66. See Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980). 
67. Pike v. Bruce C:hurch, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
68. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 640 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 
137, 142 (1970)). "Evenhandedness" here means that a state's regulatory scheme must not 
further residents' interests at the expense of the interests of residents in other states. If the stat-
ute is characterized as investor protection legislation, it would appear that the statutes regulate 
evenhandedly since they pertain equally to transactions involving both resident and nonresident 
shareholders. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 721. If state takeover legislation is viewed as an 
attempt to shield target management for the purpose of keeping corporations within the state, its 
constitutionality under the commerce clause is open to greater challenge. See Shipman, supra 
note 38, at 745-46; Note, supra note 35, at 528. But see Edgar v. MITE, Corp., 457 U.S. at 646-
47 (Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting that states may have a legitimate interest in protecting in-
state corporations from takeover). 
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Illinois Act produced direct rather than incidentat restraints on inter-
state commerce. Second, the burden the Illinois Act imposed on inter-
state commerce was excessive in light of the local interests the Act 
purported to further. 
1. Direct Restraints on Interstate Commerce 
The extraterritorial reach of state takeover legislation has proven 
to be a fatal constitutional defect.69 Unlike blue sky laws, which regu-
late securities transactions occurring within a particular state and only 
incidentally affect interstate commerce, 70 most first generation state 
takeover legislation directly regulates securities transactions that take 
place across state lines. 71 Such direct regulation is prohibited by the 
commerce clause. 72 
The Illinois statute at issue in MITE reached transactions occur-
ring wholly outside of the state. 73 Analogizing the limits of state legis-
lative power to the jurisdictional limits of state courts, Justice White 
wrote that a state's direct assertion of " 'extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over persons or property would offend sister States and exceed the in-
herent limits of the State's power.' "74 
69. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641-43 (1982); Great Western United Corp. v. 
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1286 (5th Cir. 1978), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great 
Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); see also DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 38, at 231; 
Wilner & Landy, supra note 34, at 19-21; Note, supra note 34, at 1153; Note, supra note 35, at 
527-28. But see Shipman, supra note 38, at 740-55 (discussing the validity of the extraterritorial 
reach of state statutes). Even those state statutes that apply only to tender offers made for in-
state targets have been held unconstitutional on commerce clause grounds. See Dart Indus. v. 
Conrad, 426 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Delaware statute). 
It would seem that first generation state takeover statutes could avoid their unconstitutional 
extraterritorial effect by regulating only tender offers made to state residents. But this would 
certainly limit the effectiveness of state regulation as tender offerors could simply avoid soliciting 
shareholders in states with those statutes. See TENDER OFFERS, supra note 3, at 157. Neverthe-
less, the new Nebraska Takeover Act has adopted this limited regulatory approach. See CORPO· 
RATE TAKEOVER ACT, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2420(4)(b), 21-2427 (1983). 
70. The validity of blue sky laws has long been upheld as a function of the state's interest in 
protecting resident investors. See, e.g., Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550-51 (1917). 
See generally, L. Loss & E. CoWETT, BLUE SKY LAWS 17-42 (1958). 
71. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641 (1982). Even ifthe Illinois statute applied only 
to Illinois corporations, the statute would still apply to transactions (i.e., the purchase and sale of 
shares) by nonresidents. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 501 (7th Cir. 1980), ajfd. sub 
nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); see also Sargent, supra note 2, at 723. The 
Supreme Court in MITE also noted that tender offers are communicated through the mail or 
other forms of interstate commerce and that shares are tendered through similar means. State 
statutes aimed at regulating tender offers directly affect these interstate transactions. 457 U.S. at 
641-42. 
72. See Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925). 
73. 457 U.S. at 642. The Illinois Act could theoretically apply even if no Illinois residents 
owned target shares. See note 42 supra. 
74. 457 U.S. at 643 (plurality opinion) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)). 
Professor Shipman has succinctly discussed the possibility that extraterritorial application of one 
state's takeover legislation may prejudice the takeover policies of another state: 
Regulation of securities transactions protects investors from profitable as well as unprofita-
ble deals. Determining the optimum level of securities regulation is a relatively delicate, 
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2. Indirect Restraint on Interstate Commerce 
When a state statute regulates interstate commerce indirectly, the 
question under the Pike test is whether the burden imposed on that 
commerce is excessive in relation to the local interests served by the 
statute. 75 The most obvious burden first generation state takeover 
statutes place on interstate commerce arises from their ability to pre-
vent and delay tender offers anywhere in the country.76 Allowing a 
state to block a nationwide tender offer could have detrimental effects 
on investors' interests and the efficiency of markets for corporate ac-
quisition. 77 Other aspects of commerce clause analysis that point to-
ward finding first generation statutes unconstitutional include the 
possibility of exposing tender offerors to conflicting state regulatory 
schemes, the availability of alternate means of protecting investors 
that impose fewer burdens on interstate commerce, and the need for 
uniform regulation.78 On the other hand, proponents of first genera-
tion state takeover statutes argue that the statutes further two legiti-
mate local interests: protection of target security holders and 
regulation of the internal affairs of companies incorporated under state 
albeit unscientific, business. One of the bases on which lines are drawn is that investors may 
be harmed by overregulation since regulation decreases the number of buy and sell opportu-
nities presented to them. A state without a takeover statute applicable to domestic corpora-
tions may have made an implicit judgment that investors will derive the greatest benefit 
from takeover bids absent a level of regulation superadded to the federal statutes and the 
various blue sky laws. 
Shipman, supra note 38, at 749. 
75. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1981) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 
U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
76. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 643; note 37 supra. 
77. According to the MITE Court these effects include: depriving shareholders of the oppor-
tunity to sell their shares at a premium, inhibiting economic efficiency by hindering the realloca-
tion of economic resources to their highest valued use, and reducing incumbent management's 
incentive to perform well. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 643. 
On the economic effects of chilling tender offers, compare Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper 
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981); 
Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 277 
(1984); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market/or Corporate Cantro/, and the Regu-
lation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tux. L. REv. 1 (1978) (arguing that tender offers benefit target 
shareholders and that target management should generally not be permitted to take defensive 
action), with Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979); Lip-
ton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 
55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1231 (1980) (arguing that the beneficial effects of tender offers are overstated 
and that target management should be allowed to exercise its business judgment in deciding 
whether to oppose a takeover). For a discussion of the empirical data on the economic effects of 
tender offers, see Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legisla-
tion, 83 CoLUM. L. REV. 249 (1983). 
78. See Note, supra note 34, at 1160-61. Opponents of state statutes argue that the prospect 
of having to comply with the requirements of several state statutes will discourage tender offerors 
from making offers and that a uniform system of tender offer regulation must be maintained in 
order to minimize disruption of national securities markets. See, e.g., DEVELOPMENTS, supra 
note 38, at 232-33. But see Sargent, supra note 2, at 728; Note, supra note 35, at 529-30 (sug-
gesting that the burden of compliance with a number of state statutes is not severe given their 
similarities). 
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The MITE Court analyzed the Illinois statute from the perspective 
of both of these local interests and found that they failed to outweigh 
the burdens imposed on interstate commerce. Looking at the statute as 
a form of securities regulation, Justice White wrote that "[w]hile pro-
tecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the State 
has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders."80 
The low percentage of resident shareholders necessary to trigger the 
jurisdictional provisions of most first generation statutes severely un-
dermines the securities regulation rationale of these statutes. 
The Supreme Court was similarly unimpressed with the internal 
corporate affairs rationale for the Illinois statute. Proponents of state 
takeover statutes argue that because tender offers are related to inter-
nal corporate affairs, such as proxy solicitations, which are tradition-
ally regulated under the law of the state of incorporation, tender offers, 
too, should be subject to state regulation. 81 The Supreme Court flatly 
rejected this view, stating that "[t]ender offers contemplate transfers of 
stock by stockholders to a third party and do not themselves implicate 
the internal affairs of the target company."82 Five justices agreed that 
the Illinois statute failed the Pike test83 and thus violated the com-
79. See, e.g., Shipman, supra note 38, at 740-46 (regulation of internal corporate affairs); 
Note, supra note 35, at 529 (protection of shareholders); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 
at 646 & n. * (Powell, J., concurring) (states have a legitimate interest in keeping corporate head· 
quarters within the state); Boehm, supra note 64, at 741-46 (state takeover legislation furthers 
additional state interests in regulating foreign corporations doing business within the state and in 
preventing precipitous shifts in the location of headquarters of in-state corporations). 
80. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 644; see also Note, supra note 35, at 528. Insofar as 
the Illinois Act attempted to protect resident investors, the Supreme Court agreed with the court 
of appeals that the Illinois disclosure, withdrawal and pro rata provisions afforded only a margi· 
nal increase in protection over the Williams Act and current SEC rules. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 
457 U.S. at 645 (agreeing with MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 500 (7th Cir. 1980)), See 
also Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 (5th Cir. 1978), revd. on other 
grounds sub nom Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (increased disclo-
sure may confuse investors). The MITE courts also believed that any increase in investor protec· 
tion afforded by the Illinois Act was offset by the risk that the delay created by the provisions 
would deter lucrative tender offers. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 645 (citing MITE Corp. v. 
Dixon, 633 F.2d at 500). 
81. See Shipman, supra note 38, at 741-45; see also Sargent, supra note 2, at 724-26 (discuss-
ing arguments on both sides of this issue). This argument is significant in that it offers a justifica-
tion for the extraterritorial reach of first generation state takeover statutes: the state of 
incorporation has historically regulated corporate matters despite the fact that this may entail 
regulation of transactions occurring outside the state. See Boehm, supra note 64, at 743; Ship-
man, supra note 38, at 742-43. Furthermore, state corporation law is entitled to full faith and 
credit in other states. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 
(1947). See generally Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law 
and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1958). Full faith and credit 
would mitigate the critique that tender offerors will be subject to conflicting state statutes. 
Courts could apply the takeover law of the state in which the target was incorporated. 
82. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 645; see also Wilner & Landy, supra note 34, at 16-17; 
Note, supra note 34, at 1153-55 (suggesting that a tender offer does not implicate corporate 
internal affairs but is merely the aggregate of numerous individual sales of securities). 
83. Justice Powell joined this part of the opinion of the court because its reasoning "leaves 
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merce clause. 
B. Preemption 
States are preempted from regulating areas in which Congress is 
competent to legislate if any one of four tests is met. 84 The preemption 
debate surrounding state takeover regulation has focused on the ques-
tion of whether state regulation frustrates congressional objectives in 
the Williams Act in some substantial way.85 Under this test, courts 
,and commentators have attempted to define Congress' intent in pass-
ing the Williams Act. There is general agreement that Congress was 
concerned with protecting investors. 86 What is not clear, however, is 
the meaning of investor protection. 
1. The Argument for Preemption: The Market Approach to Investor 
Protection 
According to the Fifth Circuit in Great Western United Corp. v. 
some room for state regulation of tender offers." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, 
J., concurring). Thus, while Justice Powell agreed that the balance of burdens on interstate 
commerce and local benefits indicated that the Illinois statute violated the commerce clause, he 
would not necessarily bar less offensive state regulation. 
84. The four tests, any of which will lead to a finding of preemption are: (1) Express con-
gressional intent to exclude state regulation. See, e.g., Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218 (1947) (Federal Warehouse Act expressly preempts all concurrent legislation). (2) Congres-
sional intent to exclude state regulation implied by the pervasive scheme of federal regulation. 
See, e.g., Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (pervasive scheme of federal 
aircraft noise regulation suggests preemption of state law); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 
315 U.S. 148 (1942) (pervasive scheme of federal regulation of renovated butter preempts state 
regulation). (3) Direct conflict between federal and state regulatory schemes so that compliance 
with both is physically impossible. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 
132, 142-43 (1963) (discussing hypothetical physical impossibility and citing relevant cases). (4) 
State regulation that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (state alien 
registration acts preempted). 
85. Most courts and commentators agree that in passing the Williams Act, Congress did not 
explicitly or implicitly prohibit states from regulating tender offers. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 
457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982); see also Sargent, supra note 2, at 704-06; Shipman, supra note 38, at 
756-58; Note, supra note 35, at 519-20. But see Wilner & Landy, supra note 34, at 25; Note, 
supra note 34, at 1164-66. 
In most cases it is possible for an offeror to comply with both state and federal tender offer 
regulation. However, the SEC has attempted to provoke a direct conflict between federal regula-
tions and state precommencement notification provisions by adopting Rule 14d-2(b) requiring 
that a tender offeror make its offer effective within five days of publicly announcing the material 
terms of the offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1984). The SEC, in acknowledging this "direct and 
substantial" conflict, explained that Rule 14d-2(b) was "necessary for the protection of investors 
and to achieve the purpose of the Williams Act." Tender Offers, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] 
FED. SEC. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,373, at 82,584 (Dec. 19, 1979). The commission believed that "the 
state takeover statutes .•. frustrate[d] the operation and purposes of the Williams Act." Id. For 
a discussion of the conflict between state precommencement notification provisions and Rule 
14d-2(b) and a look at state attempts to avoid preemption, see Sargent, supra note 2, at 707-12. 
86. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. I, 26-37 (1977). 
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Kidwell, 87 Congress, in the Williams Act, "relied on a 'market ap-
proach' to investor protection."88 The court stated that Congress re-
cognized that tender offers often benefit individual investors89 and thus 
Congress advocated a narrow regulatory role in the tender offer area. 
Congress realized, howev~r, that laissez-faire is inconsistent with in-
vestors' interests. To counteract the speed and secrecy of the unregu-
lated tender offer, the Williams Act attempts to insure that investors 
are provided with enough time and information to decide whether to 
tender their shares,90 while at the same time leaving investors the op-
portunity to receive attractive tender offers. Individual investors, not 
a governmental "benevolent bureaucracy,"91 or a fiduciary target 
management,92 should decide whether a tender offer succeeds or fails. 
However, in order to protect the investor's decision-making ability 
from bias, Congress had to avoid giving an advantage to either the 
tender offeror or to target management.93 Neutrality between offerors 
and management thus becomes the essence of investor protection. 
State takeover regulation presents two related obstacles to the Wil-
liams Act's market approach to investment protection. First, state reg-
ulation may rely on a benevolent bureaucracy or target management's 
fiduciary duties to protect investors. The Williams Act emphasizes 
investor autonomy. Second, state regulation may disrupt the neutral 
balance the Williams Act established between tender offerors and tar-
get management. By putting tender offerors and target management 
on equal footing, Congress intended to leave investors free to make 
informed, unbiased decisions regarding takeover bids. The preemp-
tion test used by those courts that view the Williams Act as adopting a 
market approach is whether the state regulation upsets that neutral 
balance.94 Justice White argued in MITE that pre-commencement no-
87. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western 
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). 
88. 577 F.2d at 1276. 
89. 577 F.2d at 1277. 
90. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text. 
91. In MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir. 1980), ajfd. sub nom. Edgar v. 
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), the Seventh Circuit in examining an administrative hearing 
provision characterized "Illinois' substitution of [its] judgment •.. for an investor's own assess-
ment of the equitability of a tender offer" as a "benevolent bureaucracy." 633 F.2d at 494. 
"[T]his approach to investor protection • . . is preempted by the • . . Williams Act, which con-
templates unfettered choice by well-informed investors." 633 F.2d at 494. 
92. The Fifth Circuit described the "fiduciary approach" of state takeover statutes as "[reli-
ance] upon the business judgment of corporate directors with a fiduciary duty to their sharehold-
ers" to protect investors instead of letting investors bargain for themselves. 577 F.2d at 1279. 
"[T]he market approach to investor protection adopted by Congress and the fiduciary approach 
... are incompatible." 577 F.2d at 1279. 
93. See Edgar v. MITE Corp, 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982) ("[A] major aspect of the effort to 
protect the investor was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder."); see also 
note 25 supra. 
94. Kidwell, 571 F.2d at 1279-80 ("Idaho disrupted the neutrality indispensable for the 
proper operation of the federal market approach to tender offer regulation. The • • • statute 
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tifi.cation, 95 administrative hearing96 and fairness provisions97 favored 
target management and reduced investor autonomy in derogation of 
congressional design. Thus, according to Justice White, the Illinois 
statute was preempted by the Williams Act. 
2. The Argument Against Preemption: Investor Protection Through 
Additional Regulation 
Those who support state takeover regulation, like those who op-
pose it, emphasize the investor protection goals of the Williams Act. 
,They reject, however, the proposition that Congress intended to adopt 
a particular method to achieve this goal.98 Under this view, the "mar-
ket approach's" neutral balance between tender o:fferors and target 
management does not represent a congressional objective, but is 
merely an incident of the Williams Act's disclosure policies.99 In sup-
port of this view, proponents of state takeover legislation cite the legis-
lative hearings on the Williams Act100 and the Supreme Court's 
discussion of the Act's legislative history in Piper v. Chris-Craft 
Industries. 101 
'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives' of 
the Williams Act.") (footnotes omitted); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 635. 
95. "[B]y providing the target company with additional time within which to take steps to 
combat the offer, the preco=encement notification provisions furnish incumbent management 
with a powerful tool to combat tender offers, perhaps to the detriment of the stockholders . 
• • • " MITE, 451 U.S. at 635. 
96. ''The potential for delay provided by the hearing procedures upset the balance struck by 
Congress by favoring management at the expense of stockholders." 457 U.S. at 639. 
97. "[T]he state thus offers investor protection at the expense of investor autonomy - an 
approach quite in conflict with that adopted by Congress." 457 U.S. at 640 (quoting 633 F.2d at 
494). 
98. See Boehm, supra note 64, at 750; Sargent, supra note 2, at 714-15; Shipman, supra note 
38, at 759. 
99. In the words of one student co=entator, "Any balance that emerged from the Williams 
Act was neither a 'purpose' nor an 'objective' of its draftsmen, but rather a byproduct of the 
congressional desire to 'require full and fair disclosure.' " Note, supra note 35, at 522; see also 
Boehm, supra note 64, at 747. 
100. In an often quoted remark, SEC Chairman Cohen stated, "The principal point is that we 
are not concerned with assisting or hurting either side. We are concerned with the investor who 
today is just a pawn in a form of industrial warfare. . . . The investor is lost somewhere in the 
shuflle. This is our concern and our only concern." Full Disclosure of Corp. Equity Ownership and 
in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the 
Senate Committee on Banking and Cu"ency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1967), quoted in Piper v. 
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1977) (emphasis supplied by the court). 
101. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). The Piper Court stated, "Neutrality is ... but one characteristic of 
legislation directed toward a different purpose-the protection of investors." 430 U.S. at 29. 
The proponents' reliance on Piper is to some extent misplaced. The issue before the court in 
that case was whether the Williams Act confers a private right of action upon defeated tender 
offerors. The Court held that Congress intended to protect investors, not tender offerors, in the 
Williams Act. The Court did not discuss whether the Williams Act embodies a neutral regula-
tory approach to tender offers with which the states could not interfere. See Crane Co. v. Lam, 
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1J 97,896 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 1981) (holding a 
Pennsylvania law preempted by the Williams Act because it gave target management advantages 
not contemplated by Congress). 
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The proponents of state takeover regulation further contend that 
state statutory provisions such as those for pre-commencement notifi-
cation are consistent with the goal of investor protection because they 
reduce the pressure on shareholders to tender immediately and miti-
gate the panic atmosphere surrounding a tender offer. 102 Indeed some 
commentators argue that state statutes realize the goals that the Wil-
liams Act was designed, but failed, to achieve. 103 The fact that state 
regulation may also create delay, which may help target management 
defeat a tender offer, does not in their view create a basis for preemp-
tion.104 Proponents of state regulatory efforts argue that Congress 
wanted to protect investors; it did not intend to confer upon tender 
offerors a right to make an unfettered offer. 
3. A Suggested View of the Williams Act 
This subsection argues that the correct view of the Williams Act 
lies close to the "market approach" view. The "market approach" 
view recognizes the interrelatedness of neutrality and the Williams 
Act's concept of investor protection. The legislative history of the Act 
indicates that Congress believed that a neutral balance between tender 
offerors and target management would benefit investors by preserving 
their opportunity to receive attractive tender offers and by providing a 
check on inefficient management.105 Thus, contrary to the opinion of 
some proponents of state takeover legislation, neutrality and investor 
protection are integrated principles.106 
There is, however, a tendency under the "market approach" view 
to overemphasize the purposefulness with which Congress adopted a 
neutral regulatory stance in the Williams Act. The legislative history 
reveals that Congress adopted a neutral stance not simply because 
102. See, e.g., Sargent, supra note 2, at 716-20; Note, Response to Great Western, supra note 
3, at 913, 915; Note, supra note 35, at 524. 
103. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 719; Note, Response to Great Western, supra note 3, at 915. 
104. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 715-16; Note, supra note 35, at 524-25. 
105. The following exchange between Senator Javits and Senator Williams, the sponsor of 
the Williams Act, illustrates congressional concern over tender offer regulation: 
Mr. JAVITS. One other question I should like to ask the Senator: There is no intend-
ment in the measure • . . to in any way condemn the practice of making tenders, is there? 
Sometimes stockholders do very well because of tenders, especially competitive tenders. 
Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. There is no intention in any way to prohibit tender 
offers. As a matter of fact, I think it [the Williams Act] might encourage them. 
113 CoNG. REc. 24,665 (1967). See also 113 CoNG. REc. 854 (1967) (In his remarks before the 
Senate, Senator Williams stated that "[the Williams Act] is not aimed at obstructing legitimate 
takeover bids. In some instances, a change in management will prove a welcome boon for share-
holder and employee . . • ."). 
106. Congress recognized that the pro-management bias of the early versions of the Williams 
Act was detrimental to investors' interests in receiving lucrative tender offers. See Piper, 430 
U.S. at 30. Thus, to a large extent, Congress perceived neutrality and investor protection as 
integrated principles. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 1980}, ajfd. sub 
nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982} ("[A]n equitable balance between the contend-
ing sides is perceived as a principal means of investor protection."). 
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neutrality preserves investors' opportunities to receive tender offers, 
but in part because it was unsure of what type and degree ofregulation 
would best serve investors' interests.107 Given this uncertainty, it is 
incorrect to speak of the Williams Act as establishing an immutable 
congressional balance. 
Although the argument against the "market approach" is useful in 
that it questions the purposefulness of the neutral balance in the Wil-
liams Act, 108 the argument often goes too far. The Williams Act does 
affirmatively recognize neutrality as an element of investor protec-
tion.109 This is made explicit in the congressional debates and is im-
plicit in the reformulation of the pro-management bias of the original 
version of the Williams Act. 11° Furthermore, discussion of the Wil-
liams Act in Congress subsequent to its passage suggests that Congress 
has embraced the courts' "market approach" interpretation of the 
Act.1 11 Thus, even if Congress initially adopted a neutral stance for 
107. The legislative history reveals that there was great disagreement over the desirability of 
facilitating or hindering the tender offer process. While some tender offers proved lucrative to 
investors and the national economy, others provided a vehicle with which self-interested outsid-
ers could "raid" a target. In view of this lack of consensus on tender offer policy, Congress 
determined to "avoid tipping the balance of regulation." See S. REP. No. 550, supra note 15, at 
3; H.R. REP. No. 1711 at 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS, at 2813, supra 
note 15; 113 CoNG. REc. 24,664 (1967). This language, often used to support the market ap-
proach view of the act, see note 25 supra, may in fact be interpreted to support the opposite view. 
The passive tone of "avoid tipping" may suggest that Congress did not intend to establish a 
neutral balance between tender offerors and target management, but rather opted for neutrality 
due to an inability to reconcile incompatible economic philosophies on how best to protect inves-
tors in the tender offer context. See Boehm, supra note 64, at 749-50; Note, supra note 35, at 522 
n.81. 
108. Proponents of state takeover legislation emphasize Congress' uncertainty about the 
proper role and strength of federal regulation. See Boehm, supra note 64, at 749-50; Shipman, 
supra note 38, at 759-60. When such uncertainty exists it is appropriate to allow states to per-
form their Brandeisian laboratory functions. See Shipman, supra note 38, at 760. States should 
therefore be left free to experiment in order to find the best method for protecting investors. One 
commentator has suggested: "If a scheme of state regulation does not eliminate 'the basic capa-
bility of offerors to make successful tender offers' and if the scheme is in fact designed to protect 
investors . . • then there would seem to be little basis for objection." Sargent, supra note 2, at 
715 (quoting MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 1980), affd. sub nom. Edgar v. 
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982)). 
However, even if one accepts that Congress did not establish an immutable balance in the 
Williams Act, one may still reject the states' role in altering the balance. See Great Western 
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1280 n.52 ("Changing economic conditions may have dis-
rupted the balance that Congress struck in the Williams Act. But, it is for Congress - not Idaho 
- to determine if adjustments in the federal balance are necessary, and if so, what adjustments 
should be made."), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 
U.S. 173 (1979). The national market for corporate acquisition may not be an appropriate area 
for individual states to perform their Brandeisian laboratory functions. 
109. A commentator sympathetic to state efforts in the takeover area stated that "[i]t is diffi-
cult to describe the Williams Act's policy of investor protection through full and fair disclosure 
without reference to regulatory neutrali~y, and the Piper language, when considered in context, 
does not support a contrary view." Sargent, supra note 2, at 714. 
110. See note 107 supra. 
111. During consideration of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 
15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976), Congress specifically addressed the ten-day proration period of the Wil-
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mixed reasons, the theory that Congress adopted neutrality because it 
promotes investors' interests now predominates. Congressional ac-
quiesence in this judicially accepted view of the Williams Act merits 
recognition. 
Accepting the importance of neutrality in federal tender offer legis-
lation means that the states may play only a narrow regulatory role. 
While the Williams Act does not reflect an immutable balance be-
tween tender offerors and target management it does suggest that the 
balance is an important aspect of the Act's goal of investor protection. 
In short, states may, to a limited extent, depart from the neutral regu-
latory balance of the Williams Act in search of better ways of protect-
ing investors' interests; however, states may not depart in a manner 
that is likely to decrease significantly investors' opportunities to re-
ceive tender offers for their shares. This is the preemption standard 
against which the Maryland legislation should be judged. 
Ill. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MARYLAND APPROACH 
This Part analyzes the Maryland statute in terms of the commerce 
clause and preemption challenges that led to the invalidation of first 
generation statutes. While states have a legitimate interest in protect-
ing investors in potential freezeout situations, state regulation must be 
consistent with congressional objectives in federal tender offer legisla-
tion and must not overburden interstate markets for corporate 
acquisition. 
The Maryland statute, like first generation legislation, is subject to 
commerce clause attack; however, the case for invalidation on com-
merce clause grounds is less compelling here than in the context of 
first generation statutes. By concentrating on the second step of the 
takeover process and limiting jurisdiction to corporate domiciliaries, 
the Maryland legislation cuts back on the extraterritorial reach that 
Iiams Act. The House Report and comments by Congressman Rodino reaffirm the importance 
of neutrality in the federal regulatory scheme. 
The House Report stated: 
[I]t is clear that this short waiting period was founded on congressional concern that a 
longer delay might unduly favor the target firm's incumbent management, and permit them 
to frustrate many pro-competitive cash tenders. This ten day waiting period thus under-
scores the basic purpose of the Williams Act - to maintain a neutral policy towards cash 
tender offers, by avoiding lengthy delays that might discourage their chances for success. 
H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12; reprinted in 1976 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
2572, 2644 (emphasis added). 
Congressman Rodino explained to the House: 
Lengthier delays will give the target firm plenty of time to defeat the offer • . • • And the 
longer the waiting period, the more the target's stock may be bid up in the market, making 
the offer more costly and less successful. Should this happen, it will mean that shareholders 
of the target firm will be effectively deprived of the choice that cash tender offers give to 
them • . • . Generally, the courts have construed the Williams Act so as to maintain • • • 
options for the target company's shareholders, and the House conferees contemplate that the 
courts will continue to do so. 
122 CoNG. REc. 30,877 (1976) (emphasis added). 
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proved fatal to first generation statutes. But even if the Maryland stat-
ute is not clearly invalid under the commerce clause it fails on the 
preemption grounds left open in MITE. The regulation is likely to 
upset the balance between tender offerors and target management in a 
manner that threatens to decrease significantly investors' opportunities 
to receive tender offers. It therefore interferes with congressional 
objectives in the Williams Act. 
A. Commerce Clause 
The Maryland statute successfully avoids placing impermissible di-
rect restraints on interstate commerce. It does not put conditions on 
tender offers communicated across state lines, but focuses primarily on 
the internal corporate affairs of companies incorporated within the 
state. Consequently, the Maryland statute's effect on interstate com-
merce is less direct than that typical of first generation statutes,112 par-
ticularly of the statute at issue in Edgar v. MITE Corp. 113 
Furthermore, because the Maryland statute is part of the state corpo-
ration law, it will receive full faith and credit from other states.114 The 
Maryland approach thus avoids the problem of exposing tender offer-
ors to conflicting state statutes. 
However, even if the statute avoids direct restraints on interstate 
commerce, it may impose indirect restraints that outweigh the local 
interests served by the statute. Moreover, to the extent that a court 
views Maryland's professed rationale for its statute as a veil for pro-
moting parochial state interests, the legitimacy of the statute will be 
undercut. Finally, even if the Maryland statute furthers legitimate 
state interests, the statute may be struck down on the ground that 
those interests may be adequately served by alternate means that im-
pose fewer burdens on interstate commerce. 
In shifting the regulatory focus on takeovers from the first step 
(tender offers) to the second step (business combinations) the Mary-
land legislature intended to avoid characterization of the statute as a 
species of securities regulation 115 and to improve the statute's chances 
of passing the Pike test for indirect restraints on commerce. Unlike 
first generation statutes that place explicit conditions on transfers of 
112. See notes 69-74 supra and accompanying text. 
113. It is true that the Maryland approach affects business combinations of large, publicly 
held corporations, which generate interstate transactions. Nevertheless, by focusing on the inter-
nal affairs of these corporations, the Maryland statute avoids the problems of extraterritorial 
reach which troubled the Court in MITE. See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text; see also 
STAFF REPORT, supra note 50, at 69. 
114. See Shipman, supra note 38, at 742 n.124; note 81 supra. 
115. To the extent that a state statute is a form of securities regulation, it is clear that the 
state interest in regulation is limited to protection of resident investors. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 
457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982). The Maryland statute applies to corporate domiciliaries regardless of 
the number of resident shareholders. Hence the statute has little to co=end it as a valid form 
of securities regulation. See note 80 supra and accompanying text. 
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stock by target shareholders to the tender offeror, the Maryland stat-
ute "implicate[s] the internal affairs of a target company,"116 and so is 
related to traditional forms of state corporation law. 
The Maryland statute's status as state corporation law offers sup-
port against commerce clause attack. The law of the state of incorpo-
ration has historically regulated corporate internal affairs despite the 
fact that this may mean regulation of transactions occurring outside 
the state.117 The state of incorporation also plays a legitimate role in 
protecting resident and nonresident corporate shareholders under 
state fiduciary doctrines.118 Arguably, the Maryland statute protects 
investors by insuring them a fair freezeout price. This may appear to 
be a more tangible benefit than the extra time and disclosure benefits 
of first generation statutes.119 
But Maryland's interest in regulating corporate internal affairs and 
- protecting investors may not offset the burdens its statute places on 
interstate commerce. Unlike first generation statutes, the Maryland 
legislation does not obstruct interstate commerce by blocking nation-
wide tender offers. However, it burdens commerce by increasing the 
costs of corporate takeovers. 12° Corporate takeovers may be desirable 
from the standpoint of interstate commerce because they serve as a 
discipline on inefficient management. Business combinations after a 
takeover may improve resource allocation and produce economies of 
scale.121 The MITE Court emphasized that these salutary effects are 
negated by anti-takeover legislation.122 
Another burden produced by the Maryland statute concerns its 
potential interference with the accuracy of markets for corporate ac-
quisition. It may increase takeover costs for reasons irrelevant to the 
target company's value by artificially tying freezeout price to tender 
offer price whatever the vicissitudes of the market.123 The value of a 
target, as reflected in its share and asset value, may drop in the time 
116. See note 82supra and accompanying text. But see notes 143-49 infra and accompanying 
text (Maryland statute reaches arm's length transactions more akin to tender offers than corpo-
rate internal affairs). 
117. See Boehm, supra note 64, at 743; see also Shipman, supra note 38, at 742-43. 
118. Boehm, supra note 68, at 743. However, it is not clear that state fiduciary doctrines are 
applicable in all corporate takeover contexts. The two-tier offer (tender offer and freezeout 
merger in a short period of time) may be regarded as an arm's length transaction between the 
tender offeror and target shareholders. The shareholders may not need the protection of state 
fiduciary law. See notes 146-48 infra and accompanying text. Indeed, the application of state 
fiduciary law in the context of two-tier tender offers may conflict with the market approach of the 
Williams Act. See note 182 infra. 
119. But see Toms, supra note 48, at 571 (After a successful tender offer, minority sharehold· 
ers may be harmed by a rule tying freezeout price to tender offer price.). 
120. See id. at 571-75 (discussing the effect of an equal consideration rule in two-step transac· 
tions on corporate acquisition markets). See also notes 175-77 infra and accompanying text. 
121. See Toms, supra note 48, at 572 n.83. 
122. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 643. 
123. See Toms, supra note 48, at 571. 
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period between a first step tender offer and a planned second step 
freezeout. In this situation, under the Maryland fair price provision 
the tender offeror will be forced to choose between foregoing_ the 
freezeout or paying a freezeout price that is artificially high relative to 
the target's value.124 "The public interest in an accurate market will 
be harmed to the extent that the [target] company's assets are being 
less accurately valued .... "12s 
The Maryland approach may also have a chilling effect on tender 
offers. Often the object of obtaining control of a target through a 
tender offer is to force a business combination. If this objective be-
comes more expensive as a result of supermajority and fair price provi-
sions, it is reasonable to assume that some people will be deterred from 
making tender offers.126 The Maryland approach is then subject to the 
criticism levied at first generation statutes - that shareholders may be 
deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium.127 
In addition, if the true purpose of the statute is to insulate in-state 
corporations at the expense of national markets for corporate acquisi-
tion, the commerce clause prohibits the advancement of such paro-
chial interests.128 A number of commentators have suggested that first 
generation statutes are designed to promote economic protection-
ism.129 The Maryland approach may have a substantial anti-takeover 
effect and may be subject to the same economic protectionism claim. 
Courts may be reluctant to question a state statute's asserted ra-
tionale, but even assuming that the Maryland statute promotes legiti-
mate state interests, the statute may still be declared invalid if there 
exist less burdensome means of achieving the desired statutory re-
sult.130 If the goal is to protect shareholders from the coercive effects 
of two-tier tender offers and freezeout mergers, alternative measures, 
such as a new type of appraisal statute, could provide target share-
holders with benefits similar to those accorded by the Maryland ap-
proach with less disruption of markets for corporate acquisition.131 
Ultimately, the question of the validity of the Maryland approach 
124. This assumes that the tender olferor did not obtain a "friendly offer exemption" under 
the Maryland statute, see notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text, and that the tender olferor is 
unable to command a supermajority vote on a lower freezeout price. 
125. Toms, supra note 48, at 573 n.89. 
126. Id. at 572; see also notes 167-68 & 175-77 supra and accompanying text. 
127. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 633 n.9, 643. 
128. See Note, supra note 34, at 1158-59. 
129. See note 34 supra. 
130. See Note, supra note 34, at 1160-61. 
131. Some legal commentators have urged that investors' interests may best be served by 
limiting frozen-out shareholders to an appraisal remedy. These commentators add, however, 
that to protect investors adequately, appraisal techniques should be revised to take into account 
elements of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the freezeout mergei:. See 
Toms, supra note 48, at 575-83; Comment, supra note 48, at 418-21. This approach was endorsed 
by the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983). 
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under the commerce clause is less clear than it is for first generation 
statutes. Because the new Maryland statute is more closely related to 
traditional forms of internal corporate affairs regulation than the Illi-
nois statute struck down in MITE, 132 Maryland may have a stronger 
state interest in its statute under the Pike test than the Supreme Court 
was willing to accord to the Illinois statute.133 However, the outcome 
of the balancing test is difficult to predict. This lack of clarity on the 
commerce clause question is likely to lead a court to reexamine the 
issue of when state takeover legislation is preempted by the Williams 
Act. 
B. Preemption 
Preemption analysis of the Maryland statute must focus on 
whether its provisions frustrate congressional objectives in the Wil-
liams Act. 134 This analysis is more difficult than preemption analysis 
of first generation statutes for two reasons. First, the Maryland stat-
ute, unlike first generation state statutes, has a different focus from 
that of the Williams Act: it regulates the second step of the takeover 
process. 135 Second, because the Maryland statute more closely resem-
bles traditional state corporation law than do first generation statutes, 
it would seem to implicate established principles of state fiduciary law 
which should not lightly be declared preempted.136 These factors, 
however, should not prevent a court from holding that the Williams 
Act preempts the Maryland statute. This Note argues that the 
supermajority, fair price and friendly offer exemption provisions of the 
Maryland statute are inconsistent with the concept of investor protec-
tion embodied in the Williams Act and are unconstitutional under the 
supremacy clause. 
I. Federal Regulation of Two-Tier Offers 
The Maryland statute focuses on business combinations, the sec-
ond step of the takeover process; the Williams Act concentrates on 
tender offers, the first stage. However, both statutes affect the opera-
tion of both stages of a takeover and hence present a possible conflict 
of federal and state regulatory objectives. 
132. The Supreme Court in MITE noted that the Illinois statute did not qualify as a legiti-
mate form of state securities regulation or as state regulation of internal corporate affairs. Edgar 
v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-44 (1982). 
133. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 50, at 70 Qetter of Maryland Attorney General Sachs to 
Maryland Governor Hughes). 
134. For the various preemption tests, see note 84 supra and accompanying text. There is no 
indication in the Williams Act that Congress explicitly or implicitly intended to preempt state 
takeover legislation patterned after Maryland law. It is also clear that there is no direct conflict 
between the Williams Act and the Maryland General Corporation Law. 
135. See notes 137-42 infra and accompanying text. 
136. See note 144 infra and accompanying text. 
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The Williams Act and SEC rules appear to contemplate and at-
tempt to regulate indirectly two-tier tender offers. Two recent federal 
court decisions have upheld the use of "front-end loaded two-tier of-
fers."137 In Rado! v. Thomas138 the court noted that SEC Rule 
13e-3139 "by negative implication, acknowledges that such transac-
tions occur and purports to regulate the second step of such two-tier 
transactions." 140 
Not only does federal regulation extend to the second tier, but it is 
clear that the Maryland statute touches upon the heavily federally reg-
ulated first tier. The Maryland approach will greatly affect the tender 
offerer's decision on how to structure the first step of a two-tier bid. 
Indeed, the new legislation effectively eliminates the possibility of 
making a hostile front-end loaded two-tier bid.141 Most importantly, 
by imposing strict conditions on the second step of a takeover, the 
Maryland statute may deter potential acquirers from attempting the 
first step tender offer.142 The interrelatedness of the two steps in a 
takeover process suggests that while the federal regulatory scheme and 
the Maryland approach are hardly congruent, they overlap to a suffi-
cient extent to present the preemption question of whether the Mary-
land approach stands as an obstacle to the effectuation of 
congressional objectives in the tender offer area. 
2. Preemption of State Corporation Law 
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Supreme Court indicated that first 
137. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 630-31 (D. Md. 1982); 
Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1311-13 (S.D. Ohio 1982). For a description of the front-
end loaded technique, see note 49 supra. 
138. 534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982). 
139. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1984). 
140. Rado/, 534 F. Supp. at 1312. Rule 13e-3 requires companies to disclose certain informa-
tion prior to freezing out minority shareholders. The rule exempts from disclosure certain types 
of freezeouts that present less opportunity for majority overreaching. Two-tier transactions 
(tender offer-merger) are exempted from disclosure if the tender offeror completes the second 
step merger within one year of the tender offer and pays frozen-out shareholders the same price 
offered during the tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(g)(l) (1984). Thus, a front-end loaded bid 
(in which tender offer price is higher than merger price) would not be exempted and would have 
to comply with the Rule's disclosure requirements. 
Ironically, it may benefit a tender offeror not to qualify for the above exemption. If it dis-
closes that the tender offer price will be greater than merger price, the tender offeror may pres-
sure shareholders to tender their shares in the first step. See note 149 infra. However, if the 
offeror avoids disclosure and qualifies for the exemption by offering identical tender offer and 
freezeout price, shareholders will have little incentive to tender in the first step and the offeror 
may fail to gain sufficient control to complete the second step. See Note, Freezeout Merger Regu-
lation: An SEC Rule Joins State Efforts, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 964, 980 n.161 (1980). On 
Rule 13e-3 generally, see 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEzEoUTS 
§ 9.04[1] (1984). 
141. The supermajority and fair price provisions in the Maryland statute insure that in a 
business combination opposed by target management target shareholders will not receiv.e less 
than tender offer price. 
142. See notes 167-68 infra and accompanying text. 
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generation state takeover statutes such as the Illinois Act could not be 
upheld on the ground that they promote a legitimate state interest in 
regulating the internal affairs of corporate domiciliaries. 143 The court 
did not accept the premise that tender offers are related to internal 
affairs transactions. The new Maryland legislation, however, purports 
to concentrate on the second step of the takeover process, often a 
freezeout merger. Mergers are classic examples of internal affairs 
transactions traditionally regulated under state law. In a freezeout 
merger, for example, the actions of the controlling shareholder of a 
corporation and their effect on the remaining shareholders may be po-
liced under principles of state fiduciary law.144 Thus, even ifthere is 
tension between federal regulation and the Maryland approach, a 
court might be hesitant to declare the Maryland statute preempted by 
the Williams Act.14s 
This argument for the Maryland approach fails to appreciate that 
fiduciary obligations running from the controlling shareholder to the 
remaining shareholders vary with the nature of the internal affairs 
transaction. Certain types of freezeouts present less opportunity for 
controlling shareholders to overreach than do others and hence in 
these situations there is less need to defer to state fiduciary law.146 In 
143. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). 
144. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977) (Freezeout of minority share-
holders does not provide a cause of action under § lO(b) of the 1934 Act or SEC Rule lOb-5.), 
Santa Fe involved a freezeout under Delaware's "short-form merger" statute. A parent corpora-
tion owning 95% of the stock of its subsidiary took advantage of the statute in freezing out the 
remaining 5% in a merger. The Supreme Court ruled that such corporate conduct is tradition-
ally left to state regulation. 430 U.S. at 465, 478-79. 
145. Cf. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) (a factor in determining congres-
sional intent to create a cause of action is whether the cause of action is traditionally relegated to 
the states); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 82-85 (1975) (Absent a clear expression of congressional 
intent, courts will be reluctant to imply a private cause of action for stockholders from federal 
regulation where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.). 
146. See Restatement, supra note 49, at 1359-65; Fair Shares, supra note 49, at 336-40; 
Greene, supra note 52, at 491-96. These authors contend that freezeouts should be classified 
according to their potential for majority overreaching. They would recognize three distinct cate-
gories: (1) Two-step (tender offer-merger) transactions between previously unaffiliated corpora-
tions, (2) Mergers of long-held affiliates, and (3) Pure going-private transactions. 
In the two-step transaction between two unaffiliated corporations, the acquiring corporation 
should owe no fiduciary duty to target shareholders if it discloses its plan for the target at the 
time of the tender offer and effects those plans soon after assuming control. See Restatement, 
supra note 49, at 1361. The transaction is viewed as the result of arm's length bargaining be-
tween the acquiring corporation and the target shareholders. Shareholders are able to protect 
their own interests with little state intervention. Id. But see note 159 infra. 
In the case of mergers oflong-held affiliates there are fiduciary duties running from the parent 
to the subsidiary. Contrary to the two-step acquisition in which the parties deal at arm's length, 
here the parent has the ability to act on inside information or to time the freezeout to coincide 
with its own best interests. See Greene, supra note 52, at 493. 
The "going private transaction" presents the greatest opportunity for abuse. Two separate 
on-going businesses are not involved. Rather, the controlling shareholders of a corporation sim-
ply create a new shell corporation and exchange their stock for stock in the shell corporation. 
They then proceed to merge the two corporations and freezeout minority stockholders. The shell 
corporation is thus created solely for the purpose of freezing out the minority and giving the 
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a merger of long-held affiliates there are important issues concerning 
the fiduciary obligations of directors and controlling shareholders, the 
business judgment rule and the fairness of the transaction. These issues 
have traditiOnally been resolved under state law. In contrast, the 
merger associated with the second step of a two-tier tender offer 
presents more of an arm's length situation.147 
In the two-tier offer context, the merger is proposed by an outsider, 
the tender offeror, at the same time the tender offer is announced. As 
an outsider, the tender offerer owes little or no fiduciary obligation to 
target shareholders. Moreover, the tender offeror is required at the 
outset to disclose its intention to effect a second-step merger. This 
required disclosure insures that the second step is based on arm's 
length negotiations between the tender offeror and the target share-
holders, not upon the tender offeror's use of control if the offer 
succeeds.148 
controlling shareholders complete ownership. See Restatement, supra note 49, at 1365; Greene, 
supra note 52, at 495-96. For a compilation of recent law review commentary on freezeout and 
going-private techniques, see 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 140, at § 9.01 n.6. 
147. Some courts, however, have held that fiduciary obligations exist even in the two-tier 
offer context. For example, the leading case dealing with minority freezeouts has been Singer v. 
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977), in which the Delaware Supreme Court held that a 
tender offeror could not cash out non-tendering target shareholders in a second step merger 
without showing that the merger is supported by a valid business purpose. Recently, the Dela· 
ware Supreme Court declared that the Singer business purpose test shall no longer have any 
effect. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983). The Singer business purpose test 
had been criticized by commentators for two reasons. First, the test is based on the theory that a 
controlling shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to the minority not to cash them out without a 
valid business purpose. This theory was criticized for applying fiduciary principles to a tender 
offer that is really an arm's length transaction. See Restatement, supra note 49, at 1362-64; see 
also Comment, supra note 48, at 413-16. But see Goldman & Wolfe, In Response to A Restate-
ment of Corporate Freezeouts, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 683 (1979). If the tender offeror is 
unaffiliated with the target, discloses its intention to freezeout the minority, and effects the freeze· 
out shortly after assuming control, it should not owe any fiduciary duty to target shareholders. 
See note 146 supra. Second, the business purpose test is unworkable. The distinction between a 
purpose designed to benefit the surviving corporation in the merger and one designed to benefit 
the controlling shareholder in the target (who is also going to be the owner of the surviving 
corporation) is "difficult to perceive." Goldman & Wolfe, supra, at 688; see also Greene, supra 
note 52, at 500-02; Greene & Junewicz, supra note 49, at 687. For general commentary on 
Singer, see McBride, Delaware Corporate Law: Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers, 33 Bus. LA w. 2231 
(1978); Note, Singer v. Magnavox Co.: Delaware Imposes Restrictions on Freezeout Mergers, 66 
CALIF. L. REV. 118 (1978); Note, Singer v. Magnavox and Cash Take-out Mergers, 64 VA. L. 
REv. 1101 (1978); see also Steinberg & Lindahl, The New Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers, 62 
WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1984) (tracing the development of Delaware law from Singer to 
Weinberger). 
148. Additional insurance would be provided by requiring the tender offeror to complete the 
second step soon after the end of th~ offer itself. See Greene, supra note 52, at 509. As the period 
between the steps lengthens, the original adversarial nature of the relationship between the tender 
offeror and target shareholders is blunted. As the tender offeror uses its controlling interest to 
manage the target, the minority may, over time, justifiably come to rely on the tender offeror to 
protect its interests. Also, if there is a wide gap between the tender offer and the second step, 
there is increased opportunity for self-dealing on the part of the tender offeror-controlling share-
holder. SEC rules recognize that a two-tier offer may be characterized as an arm's length trans-
action only if the second step is completed soon after the tender offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-
3(g)(l) (1984) (exempting two-tier offers from the disclosure provisions of the going-private regu-
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In sum, while state law remains important in regulating most cor-
porate internal affairs transactions, the need for state regulation is 
weakest in the context of business combinations associated with two-
tier tender offers. To the extent that the Maryland approach attempts 
to regulate such offers, the internal affairs rationale offers little protec-
tion against preemption attack. If indeed two-tier offers represent 
arm's length transactions, the disclosure and substantive provisions of 
the Williams Act can provide the appropriate means of protecting in-
vestors.149 Additional state regulation, such as the Maryland statute, 
may unnecessarily upset the Williams Act's balance between tender 
offerors and target management and therefore should be preempted. 
3. The Preemption Standard Applied 
According to the market approach view of the Williams Act, pre-
emption analysis of state takeover legislation must focus on the extent 
to which state legislation upsets the federal regulations' neutral bal-
ance between tender offerors and target management, and the concom-
itant effect on investors' opportunities to receive tender offers.150 SEC 
Rule 14d-8,151 which has effects similar to those of the fair price provi-
sion of the Maryland statute, has been strongly criticized for upsetting 
this neutral balance. An even stronger case may be made that the 
supermajority, fair price and friendly offer exemption provisions of the 
Maryland law will significantly favor target management in the take-
over contest. While many states allow shareholders to amend corpo-
rate charters to include similar supermajority provisions, 152 Maryland 
has imposed these provisions on shareholders of in-state corporations 
lations if the second step is made within one year of the tender offer and nontendering sharehold· 
ers receive a freezeout price equivalent to the tender offer price); see also note 140 supra. 
149. Professors Brudney and Chirelstein argue that while front-end loaded two-tier offers are 
arm's length transactions, target shareholders are unable to protect themselves fully. They 
assert: 
Given the inability of [a target's] dispersed stockholders to communicate with one another 
during the tender, the act of offering a higher price on tender than would be paid on merger 
would have a "whipsaw" effect on [the] stockholders. Individual stockholders would find it 
difficult or impossible to refuse a tender price of $40 when they are also made aware that if 
the tender succeeds, the remaining shares will be merged out at $30. In effect, an announced 
disparity between the tender and the merger figure would deprive stockholders of their abil· 
ity to make unforced, independent judgment on whether an average of $35 is an acceptable 
overall price for the assets of the firm. 
Fair Shares, supra note 49, at 337. 
Brudney & Chirelstein contend that principles of fairness and investor protection dictate that 
freezeout price in a two-tier offer be set at the equivalent of tender offer price. They do not 
address, however, the preemption and commerce clause questions involved if a state were to 
enact their proposals. One student commentator has suggested that the Brudney & Chirelstein 
equal-consideration proposal is inconsistent with the federal approach to regulation of two-tier 
offers. See Comment, supra note 48, at 404-05, 422. 
150. See notes 105-11 supra and accompanying text. 
151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1984). 
152. See note 60 supra. 
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and thus may be said to have violated the principle of investor auton-
omy in the Williams Act. 
a. The controvery surrounding SEC Rule 14d-8: implications for 
the Maryland approach. The recently promulgated SEC Rule 14d-8153 
extends the ten-day proration period provided in the Williams Act.154 
The Williams Act pro rata provision is designed to alleviate some of 
the pressure placed on shareholders through the threat of an oversub-
scribed partial tender offer, by insuring that all shareholders who wish 
to receive the tender offer premium can have at least a percentage of 
their shares accepted. 155 However, there is still substantial pressure on 
target shareholders when the tender offeror announces that its partial 
offer is only the first step of a plan to gain complete control and that 
the second-step freezeout price will be lower than the partial offer 
price.156 Under the Williams Act, if a target shareholder failed to 
tender within ten days and if the tender offer were ultimately success-
ful, he might have all of his shares frozen out at the lower second-step 
price. 
The SEC, through its rule-making power, recently extended the 
proration period of the Williams Act to include the entire time the 
tender offer remains open: a minimum of twenty business days. Ac-
cording to the SEC, the extended proration period is necessary to pro-
tect investors faced with partial and two-tier tender offers. 157 The 
SEC has been severely criticized for overstepping its authority in 
promulgating this rule.158 Critics argue that the extension of the prora-
tion period is contrary to the explicit ten-day limitation in the Wil-
153. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1984). 
154. See note 27 supra. 
155. See note 27 supra. 
156. In a partial offer with no mention of a second-step freezeout, a target shareholder may 
welcome the possible change of corporate control and thus wish to hold on to his or her shares. 
If the tender offerer announces its intention to cash out remaining target shareholders in a sec-
ond step, nontendering shareholders may not be able to benefit from the change in control and 
the incentive to tender is increased. But see Green & Junewicz, supra note 49, at 676 (noting that 
there may be a great incentive to tender in a partial offer without mention of a second step if 
shareholders feel that the tender offerer when in control will run the corporation to its own and 
not the shareholders' benefit). 
157. See Pro Rata Rule, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,336 [1982-1983 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 83,306 (Dec. 15, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Release No. 
19,336]; see also Release No. 18,761, supra note 27 (release proposing revised rule 14d-8). 
158. Indeed, the rule was adopted over the dissents of SEC Chairman Shad and Commis-
sioner Treadway. Release No. 19,336, supra note 157, at 85,652-54. For detailed commentary in 
opposition to the new SEC rule, see Stephenson, Partial Tender Offers: ''Front-End Loaded" 
Transactions; Election Procedures in "Cash Election" Mergers. in NEW TECHNIQUES IN ACQUI-
smoNS & TAKEOVERS 79, 82-113 (1983) [hereinafter cited as NEW TECHNIQUES]; Note, SEC 
Tender Offer Timing Rules: Upsetting A Congressionally Selected Balance, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 
914 (1983); Recent Developments, Rulemaking Under Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act: The 
SEC Exceeds Its Reach in Attempting to Pull the Plug on Multiple Proration Pools, 36 V AND. L. 
REV. 1313 (1983). For commentary in favor of the new rule, see Green, Nathan & Gelford, The 
SEC Adopts a More Rational Proration Rule, in NEW TECHNIQUES, supra, at 198; see also 
Greene & Junewicz, supra note 49, at 692. 
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Iiams Act and upsets its intended neutral balance between tender 
offerors and target management by creating delay that will benefit tar-
get management.159 
The controversy over the neutrality principle of the Williams Act 
and the SEC's authority to alter the balance established by the Act has 
important ramifications for the validity of the Maryland statute. By 
requiring that second-step price be at least equal to tender-offer price, 
the Maryland approach may upset the balance between target manage-
ment and tender offeror even more radically than an extended prora-
tion period. Any incentive to tender early is almost completely eroded 
because whether they tender or not, target shareholders receive the 
same treatment; they may not be frozen out at lower than tender offer 
price. Indeed, the Maryland approach reduces the need for any prora-
tion period in a two-tier offer context.160 
The Williams Act pro rata provision and Rule 14d-8 attempt to 
insure that all shareholders have an equal opportunity to participate in 
the first step of a two-tier bid.161 The Maryland approach goes beyond 
this to give shareholders equal treatment in both stages of a two-step 
transaction.162 If Rule 14d-8 conflicts with the provisions of the Wil-
liams Act, then a fortiori the Maryland statute poses an impermissible 
conflict. 
b. Neutrality violations: supermajority voting, fair price provisions 
and friendly offer exemptions. Supermajority provisions make it diffi-
cult and expensive to consummate a two-step takeover. 163 Were it not 
159. See, e.g., Note, supra note 158, at 936-38; Recent Developments, supra note 158 at 1345· 
47. A longer period creates delay because target shareholders have less incentive to tender early. 
See note 111 supra. · 
160. The need for a proration period is not completely eliminated because there is still some 
risk in not tendering. If for $Orne reason the tender offeror does not complete a second-step and 
the market value of the target's share declines, the shareholder will have lost the opportunity to 
get a premium for his or her shares. See Toms, supra note 48, at 571. This risk might induce 
shareholders to tender in the first step. If this risk were great, enough shareholders might tender 
to oversubscribe the offer and trigger the pro rata provision. 
161. See Comment, supra note 48, at 404 (1982); see also SEC ADVISORY CoMMITIEE ON 
TENDER OFFERS, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 24 (July 8, 1983), reprinted in Special Edi-
tion, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1028 (July 15, 1983) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY REPORT] 
("There is substantial sentiment on the Committee that, so long as there is equal opportunity for 
all shareholders to participate in all phases of each bid, the laws should not distinguish among 
various types of bids."). 
162. One student commentator has stated, "Equal treatment of shares is a policy restricted in 
application to the tendering portion of a two-step acquisition." Comment, supra note 48, at 404 
(emphasis in original). The Williams Act's "best price" provision, § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78n(d)(7) (1982) insures that the highest tender offer price is paid to all tendering shareholders, 
even those who tendered before the consideration offered was increased. See note 28 supra. 
163. See TENDER OFFERS, supra note 3, at 260-62; 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 59, at 26-30; 
1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 140, at § 6.03[2][b]; see also Mullaney, Guarding 
Against Takeovers - Defensive Charter Provisions, 25 Bus. LAW. 1441, 1453 (1970). Most state 
corporation laws permitting supermajority voting requirements' were directed primarily at the 
charters of closely held corporations. The reasoning behind allowing such a requirement -
preventing oppression of minority shareholders - does not necessarily apply with equal force in 
the context of publicly-held corporations. See Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amend-
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for the existence of the fair price provision, Maryland's supermajority 
requirement164 could virtually give management a veto power over 
business combinations.165 Such a pro-management bias runs counter 
to the investor protection goal of the neutral stance of the Williams 
Act.166 
The management-entrenching effect of the supermajority provision 
may have a collateral effect in deterring tender offers.167 Since the 
goal of a tender offer is often to gain sufficient control to complete a 
takeover, the increased difficulty of achieving this goal may act as a 
disincentive to tender offerors.168 This result may harm investors by 
' denying them potential tender offers and the benefits of new 
management. 169 
The fair price provision in the Maryland statute represents a means 
of avoiding the supermajority vote on a business combination.170 
Although at first glance the fair price provision may seem to correct 
the disruption of the neutral balance caused by the supermajority vot-
ing requirement, 171 the fair price provision itself is inconsistent with 
ments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REv. 775, 813 (1982); 
Johnson, Anti-Takeover Actions and Defenses: Business Judgements or Breach of Duty?, 28 VILL. 
L. REV. 51, 72 (1982); see also W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPO-
RATIONS 461 (5th ed. 1980) (Supermajority voting requirements are "normally adopted for the 
sole purpose of insuring that incumbent managers will not lose their positions as a result of a 
takeover bid."). But see Smith, Fair Price and Redemption Rights: New Dimensions in Defense 
Charter Provisions, 4 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1, 10 (1978) (no sound public policy against letting share-
holders in publicly held corporations adopt supermajority voting requirements). 
164. See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text. 
165. Maryland's state-imposed supermajority provision would seem to have significant man-
agement-entrenchment tendencies because a business combination must be approved by a two-
thirds disinterested shareholder majority. Target management may own enough shares to block 
the business combination even if the tender offeror acquires 80% of the total outstanding target 
shares. See notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text; cf. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 49, at 
703 n.278 ("The deterrent effect of a 'supermajority' provision is particularly high where man-
agement controls enough shares to block the supermajority vote even if the offeror tenders for all 
outstanding shares."). 
166. See note 105 supra and accompanying text. 
167. Indeed, a main purpose of shark-repellent provisions is to deter tender offers: ''The idea 
is to amend the target's articles of incorporation to make it a less desirable or more difficult 
acquisition, and thereby to encourage the 'shark' to seek a more appetizing or more easily di-
gested alternative." Gilson, supra note 163, at 777. 
168. Cf. Friedenberg, Jaws Ill: The Impropriety of Shark-Repellent Amendments as a Take-
over Defense, 7 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 32, 43, 84, 88 (1982) (supermajority provisions prevent share-
holders from accepting offers and also deter bidders); Gilson, supra note 163, at 796-800 
(supermajority requirement raises the cost of offers but deterrent effect is attenuated by differing 
incentives to offeror and by costs to management of resistance). 
169. See note 77 supra and accompanying text; Friedenberg, supra note 168, at 84, 88. 
170. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text. 
171. Unlike the supermajority requirement, the fair price provision offers little direct advan-
tage to target management. The existence of the provision means that management cannot use its 
voting power to block a business combination. See Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Takeovers: 
Charter and By-Law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537, 553-54 (1979). However, requiring tender 
offerors to pay "fair price" in the second step may indirectly benefit incumbent management by 
increasing the cost of a takeover. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 38, at 196. 
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the market approach. Under the market approach view, the Williams 
Act requires only that all target shareholders receive an equal opportu-
nity to participate in a tender offer.172 Those who choose not to tender 
presumably make a conscious decision concerning the risks and ad-
vantages of holding onto their shares and should not be entitled to the 
same treatment as tendering shareholders. Yet the Maryland fair 
price provision insures that all target shareholders - tendering and 
nontendering - receive similar treatment in the takeover process.173 
The fair price provision of the Maryland statute conflicts with the 
principles of the Williams Act in other respects. First, the fair price 
provision eliminates the capacity of tender offerors to make front-end 
loaded two-tier bids, a technique implicitly recognized and permitted 
under federal regulations.174 Second, because target shareholders 
know that they cannot be frozen out at less than tender offer price, the 
pressure to respond to a tender offer is greatly reduced. 175 As the criti-
cism of SEC Rule 14d-8 has suggested, the reduced pressure on share-
holders to respond to a partial or two-tier offer works to the advantage 
of target management.176 Management gains more time to block a 
tender offer while tender offerors are likely to have to incur greater 
expense to succeed. This is likely to cut down on the willingness of 
people to make tender offers,177 an effect inconsistent with the concept 
of investor protection in the Williams Act. Finally, the mechanics of 
Maryland's fair price provision are such that the tender offeror will 
have great difficulty ascertaining the cost of the second step of a take-
over.178 This makes the first step, the tender offer, less attractive, 
again disrupting the balance of the federal statute. 
The Maryland statute also disrupts the balance between tender of-
ferors and target management by granting target management discre-
tion to exclude certain business combinations from the coverage of the 
Iaw.179 Many courts and commentators analyzing the friendly offer 
exemptions of first generation state takeover statutes have found that 
such exemptions tip the regulatory balance in favor of target manage-
ment.180 The legislative history of the new Maryland statute suggests 
that its friendly offer exemption is designed to accommodate target 
172. See note 161 supra and accompanying text. 
173. See note 58 supra and accompanying text. 
174. See notes 137-41 supra and accompanying text. 
175. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 38, at 196; 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 59, at 32; 
Fischel, supra note 77, at 31 n.101; Hochman & Folger, supra note 171, at 554. 
176. See notes 154-62 supra and accompanying text. 
177. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 140, § 6.03[2][c] at 6-34. 
178. See note 58 supra; see also Hochman & Folger, supra note 171, at 554-55 (deterrent 
potential of fair price provision is derived in part from the offeror's loss of control over the 
ultimate takeover price). 
179. See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text. 
180. See notes 33 & 38 supra. 
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management. Adoption of the exemption was necessary to gain sup-
port for the statute from the Maryland business community.181 The 
Maryland friendly offer exemption violates principles of neutrality and 
investor autonomy established by the Williams Act. It permits target 
management, rather than investors, to decide which takeover attempts 
should have the best opportunity for success.182 
c. Investor autonomy violations. The criticism that the friendly 
offer exemption reduces investor autonomy extends to the Maryland 
statute as a whole. The very adoption by the state of a law that deters 
takeover attempts reduces shareholder autonomy. Because its shark-
, repellent provisions are statutorily imposed instead of adopted 
through charter amendment, the Maryland approach in effect replaces 
investor autonomy with a benevolent bureaucracy.183 Some commen-
tators184 and the SEC185 have expressed doubt about the validity of 
181. Governor Hughes of Maryland vetoed the original version of the new Maryland statute 
because it was too broad. At a veto hearing, the executives of a number of Maryland corpora-
tions complained that the Bill would unnecessarily apply to friendly takeovers as well as corpo-
rate affairs that have no relationship to a takeover. These complaints figured prominently in the 
Governor's veto of the original bill. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 50, at 49-51; see also Allen, 
Maryland Bill On Takeovers Spurs a Fight, Wall St. J., May 26, 1983, at 33, col. 3. 
182. Supporters of friendly offer exemptions argue that target stockholders are benefited by 
such exemptions because management gains increased bargaining power in negotiations with the 
tender offeror. See Smith, supra note 163, at 7. In granting target management the discretion to 
determine which transactions should be subject to the new Maryland law, the Maryland ap-
proach relies on management's business judgment and fiduciary duties to protect target share-
holders' interests. But see note 92 supra (fiduciary approach is inconsistent with the market 
approach of the Williams Act); Hochman & Folger, supra note 171, at 552 (friendly offer exemp-
. tion might be subject to attack on the ground that it improperly delegates to directors discretion-
ary authority on matters reserved for stockholders). 
183. The "benevolent bureaucracy" language has been used to criticize administrative review 
provisions in first generation state takeover statutes. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 697; see also 
note 32 supra. The term may be appropriate in the Maryland context as well, because the Mary-
land statute also curtails shareholder freedom to decide which takeover attempts should have the 
best opportunity for success. · 
184.[T]he ••. argument [that shark repellent provisions should be encouraged because 
they induce tender offerers to negotiate with target management] implies that existing con-
straints on tender offers do not adequately protect the interests of target shareholders. 
There is no reason to believe that such an implication is valid. The Exchange Act imposes 
substantive restrictions on tender offers, requires extensive disclosure by the bidder, and 
contains an antifraud provision. Additional safeguards arguably conflict with the federal 
policy of neutrality which is embodied in the statute. Indeed, shark-repellent amendments 
are analogous to state antitakeover laws which delay, and sometimes prevent, the com-
mencement of a tender offer. In part, the antitakeover statutes are undesirable because they 
superimpose a pro-management bias on the regulatory scheme created by Congress and the 
SEC. This criticism also applies to shark-repellents and provides another reason for oppos-
ing their adoption. 
Friedenberg, supra note 168, at 84-85 (footnotes omitted); see also Hochman & Folger, supra 
note 171, at 554-55 (suggesting that fair price provisions may deter tender offerors more effec-
tively than provisions which merely delay a tender offeror's ability to gain control of a target). 
185. The SEC has suggested that shark-repellant amendments "appear to be inconsistent 
with the protection of investors." Proposed Amendments To Tender Offer Rules, SEC Securities 
Act Release No. 6159, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,385, SEC Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 10,959, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,374 at 
82,614 (Nov. 29, 1979). 
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shark-repellent amendments even when adopted by shareholders. 186 
The case against supermajority voting requirements, fair price provi-
sions and friendly offer exemptions is made even stronger when inves-
tors do not themselves adopt such measures. 187 
The Maryland statute clearly does provide some benefits. It elimi-
nates the coercion inherent in partial and two-tier offers188 by assuring 
nontendering shareholders a voice in the second step or, at least, treat-
ment no worse than that received by tendering shareholders. 189 These 
186. Three cases have expressly upheld shark-repellent provisions in corporate charters or 
by-laws. See Seibert v. Milton Bradley Co., 386 Mass. 656, 405 N.E. 2d 131 (1980); Providence 
& Worchester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977); Seibert v. Gulton Indus., Civ. Action No. 
5631 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1979) (reported at 5 DEL. J. CORP. L. 514 (1980)), summarily ajfd. 414 
A.2d 822 (Del. 1980). All of these cases involved changes in shareholder voting requirements. 
The changes had been approved or ratified by the shareholders. But see Moran v. Household 
Intl., No. 7730, slip op. (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1985) (unilateral adoption of "poison pill" shark-
repellant provision by corporation's board of directors held valid exercise of business judgment). 
Most co=entators view shareholder approval of shark-repellent provisions as an important 
element of the provisions' validity. See 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 59, at 12-14, 33-34; 
Friedenberg, supra note 168, at 49; see also Black & Smith, Antitakeover Charter Provisions: 
Defending Self-Help for Takeover Targets, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699, 730 (1979). In this 
regard, it is significant to note that under the new Maryland law shareholders of Maryland cor-
porations can elect to be exempt from the Maryland law only if they pass a charter amendment 
in favor of exemption by a vote of 80% of the outstanding voting shares and a vote of two-thirds 
of the voting shares not owned by interested stockholders. Mo. CORPS. & AssNs. CODE ANN. 
§ 3-603(e)(l)(ili) (Supp. 1984). 
187. The propriety of states statutorily imposing shark-repellent provisions on target share-
holders has been questioned by co=entators sympathetic to shareholder adopted shark-repel-
lent amendments: 
While it is interesting to speculate on the types of substantive corporate law changes that 
might be implemented to deal with the transfer of control, in the final analysis it may be that 
no such statutory changes are necessary. The real focus should be on the relationship be-
tween all of the stockholders and their willingness to surrender some of their present rights 
in favor of preventing one stockholder from gaining absolute control. In short, are stock-
holders willing to forego a potentially profitable tender offer in order to minimize or eliminate 
the risk that they or their fellow stockholders may emerge as minority stockholders in a con-
trolled enterprise? From this perspective, the relevant questions are for the stockholders to 
decide. 
Black & Smith, supra note 186, at 730 (emphasis added). 
Theoretically, investors are able to adopt shark-repellent provisions through corporate char-
ter amendments. If this opportunity is open, it makes sense to let investors choose for them-
selves. The Maryland legislature may have believed, however, that self-help is unavailable in 
many cases. The Staff Report to the General Assembly of Maryland states: 
It is generally agreed that a company-by-company approach does not solve the problem. It 
is unlikely that those companies having a large proportion of institutional investors would 
be unable [sic] to get a charter amendment, because it is the institutional investors who 
stand to profit most in a takeover. 
STAFF REPORT, supra note 41, at 18. 
Shark-repellent charter amendments conflict with the interests of institutional investors and 
institutional investors have usually voted against them. See TENDER OFFERS, supra note 3, at 
259-60; Gilson, supra note 163, at 826-27. However, recent data indicates that shark-repellent 
proposals have enjoyed a great deal of success. See Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, 
Analysis of Shareholder Response to 1983 Shark Repellent Proposals (May 19, 1983), reprinted 
in 2 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 59, at 615-43. 
188. See, e.g., Greene & Junewicz, supra note 49, at 676-84; Fair Shares, supra note 49, at 
337; see also Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (commenting on the 
coercive nature of tender offers in general). 
189. Maryland's response to the coerciveness of partial and two-tier offers is similar to the 
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benefits are provided, however, at the expense of tender offerors who 
are stripped of a useful acquisition technique and, more importantly, 
at the expense of those investors who desire to receive tender offers for 
their shares. The Maryland statute's potential anti-takeover effect 
cannot be reconciled with the concepts of neutrality and investor pro-
tection in the Williams Act. 190 The statute is incompatible with con-
gressional objectives in regulating tender offers and is therefore 
preempted.191 
CONCLUSION 
In Edgar v. MITE Corp. the Supreme Court declared unconstitu-
tional state legislation regulating the tender offer as a means of ob-
taining corporate control. The MITE decision did not rule out all 
forms of state regulation in this area and a number of states have de-
veloped a "second generation" of takeover legislation. The new Mary-
land statute merits special attention. Instead of regulating the tender 
offer for a controlling interest in a target corporation, the Maryland 
statute purports to protect investors by regulating what the tender of-
feror may do after gaining working control. The Maryland statute, 
through the use of "supermajority" voting requirements and a fair 
price provision, restricts the ability of the tender offeror to later 
"freezeout" minority shareholders. 
While Maryland's new statute bears some resemblance to tradi-
tional forms of state regulation of the internal affairs of corporate 
domiciliaries, the statute's effect on tender offers and corporate acqui-
sition markets suggests that it has not escaped the constitutional infir-
mities of predecessor statutes invalidated in MITE. The burdens the 
Maryland statute places on interstate commerce outweigh the local 
benefits it produces; thus the statute violates the commerce clause. 
Furthermore, the regulatory approach of the Maryland statute is in-
consistent with the conception of inv~tor protection in the federal 
proposals of Professors Brudney and Chirelstein who suggest that the freezeout price should be 
equal to the tender offer price. See Fair Shares, supra note 49, at 337; Restatement, supra note 
49, at 1361. 
190. See notes 105-11 supra and accompanying text. It may be urged that congressional 
methods of investor protection have not kept pace with innovative acquisition techniques such as 
front-end loaded two-tier offers. Nonetheless, it is for Congress, not the states, to determine what 
action, if any, should be taken. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 
n.52 (5th Cir. 1978), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 
U.S. 173 (1979) ("Changing economic conditions may have disrupted the balance that Congress 
struck in the Williams Act. But, it is for Congress - not Idaho - to determine if adjustments 
in the federal balance are necessary .••• "). 
191. "Courts have invalidated state tender offer statutes that interfere with the bidder's con-
duct of a tender offer under federal rules and burden tender offers in interstate commerce. Newly 
developed state statutes which, through regulation of target companies, have substantially similar 
effects on the ability to conduct a tender offer should not be permitted regardless of the form in 
which they are drafted." ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 161, at 34-35 (footnotes omitted). 
470 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:433 
tender offer regulatory mechanism, the Williams Act, and is therefore 
preempted under the supremacy clause. 
